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SOME CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING STATE AND
LOCAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAWSt
ESTHER RODITTI SCHACHTER*
As part of a congressional plan to implement and enforce national
ambient air standards, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 required
that every state in the Union enact or amend air pollution control
legislation and regulations by January 31, 1972. 1 To guide the states
in preparing their implementation plans, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) published, in its Proposed Regulations for Prepara-
tion, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 2 model air
pollution control regulations as "examples of the administrative pro-
visions and pollutant emission limitations a state may need for an .
approval implementation plan." 8 For the most part, these regulations
were modeled on existing state and local legislation and regulations,
although on the whole these existing laws—with a few exceptions—
were and have been unsuccessful in controlling the emission of pollu-
tion or in improving air quality to a significant extent' Environ-
mentalists and other critics have suggested many reasons for the
general failure of pollution control laws, including the limited coverage
and laxity of emission standards, the weakness of sanctions, the failure
of administrative agencies to enforce existing laws, and the failure
to pursue fully tax mechanisms as a means of control; however, these
various hypotheses remain untested by controlled experiments. In
any case, the EPA apparently assumed that nationwide implementation
by the states of the stricter nationwide emission standards of the
1970 Amendments, enforced by traditional methods of inspection and
licensing, would succeed—even though many individual states had
t This article was originally prepared under a grant by the Ford Foundation to the.
Center for Policy Research, New York City.
* A.B., U.C.L.A., 1954; J.D., Harvard University, 1957. The author is a Senior Re-
search Associate on the staff of the Center for Policy Research, New York, N.Y., and a
consultant in environmental and public law.
1 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a) (1), (2), -5(e), (f) (1970),
setting forth a timetable for submission and approval of plans and attainment of air
quality standards. The deadline for submission was January 31, 1972. This article does
not distinguish between legislation and regulations enacted by an administrative agency.
Some jurisdictions, such as New York City, have enacted their air pollution control codes
as legislation, while others adopted similar codes as administrative regulatiok
2 36 Fed. Reg. 6680 (1971),
8 Id. at 6687.
4
 Examples of such generally unsuccessful legislation, promulgated to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 but based on prior legislation, will be
pointed out throughout this article. The limited success of prior air pollution control laws
in the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area will be emphasized.
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failed to achieve significant improvement when they had used laws
and regulations similar to those suggested in the model regulations .5
After more than four hundred interested parties submitted com-
ments concerning the proposed regulations, the EPA "recast" the
model air pollution control regulations "as a series of statements re-
flecting emission limitations attainable through the application of rea-
sonably available control technology."' Thus, instead of being given a
series of concrete legislative provisions, the states received a series
of emission standards without a specific regulatory framework for
achieving the standards? In lieu of concrete regulatory provisions, the
the states were encouraged to consider "the socio-economic impact
and the relative costs and benefits of the various emission control
strategies" and emission "charges or taxes or other economic incentive
schemes."$ It was hoped that the states would devise ingenious and
successful new methods for preventing and controlling air pollution.
However, most of those states with weak laws and regulations tended
to do nothing more than issue traditional regulations following the
federal guidelines as set forth in the proposed model regulations, and
those states which already had extensive, though traditional, regula-
tory codes adhered to those regulatory schemes.'
Paying lip service to broad and noble goals of environmental pro-
tection in general and of clean air in particular has become, like kissing
babies, a perfunctory gesture in the repertoire of politicians. Sincere
environmentalists hoping to halt the trend of ecological contamination
encounter an abundance of cliche-ridden generalities in searching for
3 Should a state fail to enforce its plan, the EPA may enforce it if "the Administrator
finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so widespread that such
violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan applies to enforce
the plan effectively ... ." Thirty days' notice to the State and public notice of the Ad-
ministrator's finding must be made before the Administrator may undertake enforcement.
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a) (2) (1970). Whether enforced by the state, municipality, or the
federal government, the regulatory scheme for obtaining compliance remains the same.
36 Fed. Reg. 22406 (1971).
7 Id.
9 Id. For criticism of EPA inclusion of economic factors in the guidelines despite the
judgment of Congress not to make economic factors relevant to the development of health-
related standards under § 18S7c-5 of the Clean Mr Amendments, note 1 supra, and the
adverse effect of such inclusion on Pennsylvania's and Montana's sulfur dioxide standards,
see Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 Before the Sub-
comm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Pub. Works Comm., 92d Cong. 1st Sess.,
ser. 92-1131, pt. 1, at 368-99 (1972) (testimony of David W. Calfee, Assoc., Pub. Interest
Research Group, and Robert J. Rauch, economist, appearing on behalf of the Pub. Interest
Research Group).
9 Interview with Kenneth L. Johnson, Acting Director, Division of Air and Water
Programs, EPA, Region II, February 7, 1972. Mr. Johnson said that the states followed
the traditional regulatory scheme as set forth in the proposed model regulations because
there were no other specific guidelines and "they wanted to be safe" with respect to
approval by the EPA of their implementation plans.
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realistic implementation procedures. It is submitted that federal pro-
posals set forth in the model regulations contribute little in the way
of workable substantive guidelines to state and local legislators and
environmental advocates interested in formulating workable means of
fighting air pollution. Utilization of these federal guidelines will achieve
scant progress toward effective state and local clean air legislation.
This article seeks to stimulate an understanding of existing state
and local codes and the potential effectiveness of new and stronger
codes by analyzing and evaluating a segment of existing legislation
that contains many provisions similar to those in the federal model
regulations—the air pollution control laws in the New York-New
Jersey metropolitan region. This analysis and evaluation will focus
on a number of broad categories into which the legislative and ad-
ministrative pollution control measures of the several governmental
entities concerned may be broken down: public policy statements;
definition of terms; emission standards; banning of activities, material
and equipment; equipment and operator licensing; enforcement de-
vices and remedies; and civil and criminal penalties. The general ap-
proach in discussing these categories will be, where appropriate, first,
to review the different and sometimes contrasting legislation of the
major governmental entities within the New York-New Jersey air
pollution basin; second, to provide a brief description of selected
enforcement experiences with respect to particular provisions; and
finally to suggest legislative criteria for judging a traditional air pollu-
tion control law's potential effectiveness.
The contrasting approaches toward regulation taken within the
New York-New Jersey geographic area are all the more interesting
because they are operable within a common air pollution basin, a situa-
tion that frequently occurs within the nationwide context. Moreover,
analysis of the laws of the New York-New Jersey air pollution basin
will be broadly useful because they exemplify the many categories of
effectiveness apparent in the nation's varied regulatory schemes. Across
the country, existing state and local legislation and regulations vary
widely in the degree of their potential effectiveness. Some codes are
limited in coverage." Other, more sophisticated, laws appear to have
io In the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, some local codes remain limited
in coverage, while the state codes are reasonably comprehensive. Local codes are rela-
tively unimportant in New Jersey, which has a large state inspection and enforcement
staff; they are more important in New York because the state agency does not employ
full time air pollution control inspectors, instead relying heavily on local health sanitation
personnel to detect violations. Moreover, county laws, which are stricter than the state
laws, see, e.g., Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Cade tit. D, ch. IX, § 9-21 (1971), may not
be enforced by the county within any city, village or town having local laws consistent
with state laws and regulations. N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law § 19-0709 (Mc-
Kinney 1972) [hereinafter N.Y.E.C.L.i.
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broad coverage but contain limitations such as cumbersome enforcement
procedures that forestall effective impact. 1 ' Still other laws which have
broad coverage and tough standards are unenforceable, in large part be-
cause of factors external to the legislation, such as the multiplicity of
pollutant sources and the lack of sufficient manpower needed to carry
out enforcement." A few state and local laws have had limited success."
The laws within the New York-New Jersey air pollution basin exemplify
each of these types of laws, and moreover contain many provisions simi-
lar to the proposed model regulations. Finally, while the federal model
does not contain recommended procedural and remedial provisions, the
laws of New York City, New York State, and New Jersey will be re-
viewed in this article because the effectiveness of the model regulations
will depend upon the availability and use of these enforcement devices.
Here, then, is an analysis and evaluation of the principal types of
provisions found in air pollution control codes, with specific legislative
and enforcement examples drawn from the New York-New Jersey
metropolitan region and from the proposed model regulations."
I. PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT
Statutes often are prefaced by legislative statements describing
the general purposes and goals sought to be accomplished." These
statements lack the mandatory force of law, although the layman may
place great weight on them. Where courts experience difficulty in
interpreting statutes, however, a public policy declaration may in-
fluence judicial interpretation to some degree. It is submitted that
the mere presence or absence of such a statement is not significant
(neither New Jersey nor the proposed federal model has a policy
declaration) ; nor does a statement consisting of cliché-ridden general-
ities similar to those used in other states have any significant im-
pact on the effectiveness of the law. However, if the policy statement
contains unusually cautious language, it may influence a court in a
negative way." Such a statement may well be interpreted as reflecting
11 See, e.g., N.Y.E.C.L. §§ 19-0303 to -0511 (McKinney 1972).
12 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2 (Supp. 1971).
15 In the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, the law which has enjoyed
uniform success is the New York City law limiting the sulfur content of fuel.
14 The model regulations contain emergency provisions, 36 Fed. Reg. 6689 (1971),
which are not discussed because the purpose of this article is to review the effectiveness
of routine regulations and their enforcement. The emergency provisions were recast and
adopted, id. at 15503, and later reorganized and republished. Id. at 22414.
15 See, e.g., Cal. Health and Safety Code § 24198 (West 1967) ; Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 203.030 (1969) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 4002 (Supp. 1972) ; N.Y.E.C.L. § 19-0103 (Mc-
Kinney 1972) ; New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-1.02 (Supp. 1971).
15 But see Delogu, Legal Aspects of Air Pollution Control and Proposed State Legis-
lation for Such Control, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 884. Professor Delogu's position is in disagree-
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a cautious or even dissenting attitude on the part of the legislature.
It also reflects in some measure the sense of public priorities in the
particular jurisdiction.
In air and other pollution control legislation, certain language
signals a cautionary "yellow light." The appearance of that language
in the policy declaration or in the body of the statute may sub-
stantially strengthen a defendant's legal arguments in favor of
balancing the equities in a particular case toward business interests
and economic development, or assist defenses of "unavoidable ne-
cessity" or arguments that insufficient medical evidence exists to prove
the harmfulness of the contaminant in question. Examples of such
language which "waters down" effective pollution control measures
may be found in New York State's air pollution laws, which include
such language as: "reasonable degree of purity of the air resources";
"air purity consistent with the industrial development of the state";
"use of all available practical and reasonable methods to prevent and
control air pollution"; "maximum of cooperation"; and "laws clearly
premised upon scientific knowledge of causes as well as of effects.""
Such language in the New York statute signals a conservative, cautious
attitude on the part of the state legislature whose primary concern
in promulgating the statute apparently was the state of health of busi-
ness rather than of the public." In contrast, economic or commercial
sentiments do not appear in the declaration of policy preceding the
New York City Air Pollution Control Code." Its sole concern is,
ostensibly, pollution of the air as "a menace to the health, welfare
and comfort of the people of the city and a cause of extensive damage
to property." In reality, economic considerations were taken into ac-
count by the City Council in drafting the legislation, and so declara-
tions of policy ignoring economic implications cannot be taken
ment with my hypothesis that the absence of a policy declaration, or the presence of one
similar to other declarations, is unimportant. In his opinion, "Stating the basic legislative
intent in a section which itself is part of the enacted legislation will strengthen the en-
forcement process by giving guidance to the regulated, those who regulate and the courts."
Id. at 891-92.
17 Prior to July, 1970, all of these phrases appeared in the declaration of policy of
the New York State Air Pollution Control law, which has since been amended. N.Y. Pub.
Health Law { 1265 (1971), as amended Environmental Conservation Law of 1970, N.Y.
Session Laws ch. 140, § 10. In February, 1971, President Nixon's proposed water control
bill contained a variant of this sort of language: "taking into account the practicality
of compliance." N.Y. Times,• Mar. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 4. Informed sources said the inser-
tion of the phrase had been insisted upon by the Department of Commerce with the
support of the Office of Management and Budget. An official of the Council of Environ-
mental Quality said he had no recollection of this.
18 See Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Code tit. D., ch. IX, § 9-21.0 (1967), which
contains similar language.
18
 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-1.02 (Supp. 1971).
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literally 20
 However,. the declaration does communicate to the courts
New York City's sense of priorities.
Thus a caveat to drafters of air pollution regulations and legisla-
tion is to avoid using cautious, negative language in policy preambles.
Either avoid such policy statements altogether and let the language of
the statute speak for itself, or express general antipollution goals in
clear, unequivocal wording. Otherwise the language may provide po-
tential arguments to polluting defendants, and the possibility of judicial
interpretation contrary to the actual purpose of the statute or regula-
tion may dilute its effectiveness.
II. DEFINITION OF TERMS
The section that contains formal definitions, though it may ap-
pear dull and routine, is of vital importance. How the key terms are
defined determines the boundaries of the law and exactly what con-
stitutes a violation thereof. In air pollution control or environmental
protection legislation, the most important term is "air pollution" or
"pollution." The term is often defined, but sometimes is not.' A gen-
eral definition is unnecessary if the term's meaning is covered in the
section generally prohibiting or restricting, without precise standards,
the emission of "air contaminants." The definition may also be amply
covered in a provision generally prohibiting the emission of air con-
taminants which may cause detriment to health, safety, welfare or
comfort.22
The scope of the definition of the term "air pollution" will deter-
mine whether or not and under what conditions the enforcing agency
will be able to act preventively and what evidence will be required
to prove a violation. Before July 1970, New York State's definition
required proof that the contaminant in issue was in fact injurious to
human, plant, or animal life or property, or unreasonably interfered
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property." Under the new
and deliberately more liberal New York law, proof that the contaminant
may be injurious to life or property is sufficient;" hence the more
20 Exec. Sess. N.Y. City Council Comm. on Environmental Protection, May 24, 1971.
Four to five hours of the session were devoted to examining the economic effect upon Con
Edison and its customers of proposed regulations limiting the sulfur content of fuel. Exist-
ing contracts and possible negotiating positions between Con Edison and several major oil
companies were closely examined by the Committee.
21 For statutory provisions giving definitions, see, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111-1/2,
§ 1003(b) (Supp. 1972) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-2 (Supp. 1972) ; N.Y.E.C.L. § 19-0105
(3) (McKinney 1972). For statutes without definitions, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. ft 1857 et seq.(1970) ; New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-1.03 (Supp. 1971).
22 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.01 (Supp. 1971).
20 N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1267 (McKinney 1971).
24 "Air Pollution" means the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more
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recent law affords the enforcement agency wider scope for preventive
action. It should be noted, however, that even this broader provision
that includes possible injury to life and property does not cover pos-
sible injury to human comfort, health and welfare: the language con-
cerning comfortable enjoyment of life remains unchanged, requiring
for preventive action proof of actual rather than only possible injury
to human comfort "throughout the affected area of the state."'" In
contrast, New Jersey's very liberal definition focuses on both health
and welfare, as well as life and property, and permits preventive action
to protect health and welfare and the "enjoyment" of life or property.'"
The definition of air pollution in the proposed federal regulations is
similar to New Jersey's definition, except that, as in New York's law,
proof of actual rather than only potential interference with the enjoy-
ment of life or property is required." However, both the term "air
pollution" and its definition were deleted from the adopted federal
regulations.'"
Preventive enforcement power with respect to activities that may
be harmful to health and welfare as well as to property, like that per-
mitted by the New Jersey regulations, is deliberately broader than
power with respect to activities which may be injurious to human life
and property. One's health and welfare may often be impinged upon
without a concomitant threat to one's life. Proving actual injury to
life is more difficult than proving a tendency to injure human welfare,
which in turn requires more exact evidence than probable or actual
injury to the comfortable enjoyment of life. In regulating air pollu-
tion, real difficulties arise in proving injury to life or health due in
whole or in part to pollution.'" Thus far air contaminant health re-
air contaminants in quantities, of characteristics and of a duration which are in-
jurious to human, plant or animal life or to property or which unreasonably in.
terfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property throughout the
state or throughout such areas of the state as shall be affected thereby
N.Y.E.C.L. § 19-0107(4) (McKinney 1972).
28 Environmental Conservation Law of 1970, N.Y. Session Laws ch. 140, § 2(6)
(1970).
28 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:c-2 (Supp. 1971) defines "air pollution" as:
[T]he presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air contaminants In
such quantities and duration as are, or tend to be, injurious to human health or
welfare, animal or plant life or property throughout the State and in such terri-
tories of the State as shall be affected thereby . . . , (emphasis added).
27 "Contaminants in such quantities and durations as interferes with the enjoyment
of life or property." 36 Fed. Reg. 6687 (1971).
28
 Id. at 22406.
22 Although a court may take judidal notice that the emission of dense smoke or
dust in a populous community is injurious to health, it is not widely and universally
accepted that other contaminants are injurious. See, e.g., City of Rochester v. Macauley-
Flen Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207, 212, 92 N.E. 641, 643 (1910), where the court states:
"[I]t is a matter of common knowledge of which the courts may take judicial notice
that some injury must result from substance-laden smoke pervading the atmosphere in
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search remains very limited." Air pollution's cumulative, long-term
health effects and its important role in multifactoral health injuries
are almost impossible to prove. 81 The legislature, through its definition
of air pollution, directly controls the preventive powers of the enforc-
ing agency and its ability to prosecute polluters successfully. New
Jersey's broad definition, and New York's newer one, are undoubtedly.
legislative "green 'lights" to effective enforcement, and an essential
ingredient of the total complexity of powers and resources needed 'for
such enforcement.
The annual appearance of new pollutants such as'PCB, the syn-
thetic organic chemical, and the new industrial uses of familiar, toxic
pollutants, such as lead or asbestos, make it imperative that the defi-
nition of •"air, contaminants," "contaminants" 'or "air pollutants". be-
sufficiently broad and flexible to encompass unforeseeable new con-
taminants or uses. Inexperienced draftsmen have an unfortunate ten-
dency to specify known contaminants by name.82 Such specification is
unnecessary, and may be detrimental if it is interpreted ,by the court
as excluding contaminants not specifically named when in, actual fact
the legislature intended coverage of all air pollutants. New York City's
Code contains a very 'broad definition which , is designed to insure .
coverage ,
 of unknown as well, as known pollutants: "Air ,contaminant
means any particular matter or any gas or any combination thereof
which persons and property necessarily remain." (Emphasis added.) See Board of Health
v. New York,Central R.R., 4 N.J. 293, 299, 72 'A.2d 511, 514 (1950); Penn Dixie.
Cement Corp. v. City of Kingsport, 189 Tenn. 450, 459-60, . 225 S.W.2d 270, 279 (1949).
The enforcing agency may therefore be required to convince the court of the gen-
erally injurious nature of the contaminant at issue, though actual damage need not be
proved. See, e.g., State v. Mundet Cork Corp., 8 N.J. 359, 370, 86 A.2d I, 6 (1952). In
nuisance cases involving the recovery of damages for interference with the comfortable
enjoyment of property, or personal discomfort, annoyance, or inconvenience, courts have
awarded damages and abated the nuisance; however, as one court has stated:
lTlhe inconvenience must be something more than mere fancy, mere delicacy or
fastidiousness; it must be an inconvenience materially interfering with the or-
dinary comfort, physically, of hiiman existence, not 'merely according to elegant
and dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain, sober and simple
notions.
	
,
Tuebner v. California Street R.R., 66 Cal. 171, 174, 4 P. 1162, 1164 (1884).
.	 .
88. See, e.g., Cassell; The Health Effects of Air Pollution and Their Implications for
Control, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 197 (1968)..
81
 See, e.g., id.; Fells Institute' of Local and. State GoVernment, Government Or-
ganization for an Air Resource Management and.Control System in the Penjerdel Region,
f H (1968).
82
 See, e.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. § 35-4602(d) (1969) (" 'Air contaminant' is dust, fumes,
gas, mist, smoke or vapor, or any combination thereof.") ; Ore. Rev. Stat. { 449.760(2)
(1970) (" 'Air contaminant' means a dust, fume, gas, mist, odor, smoke, vapor, pollen,
soot, carbon, acid or particulate matter, or any combination thereof."); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 35, § 4003(4) (1964) (" 'air contaminant.' Smoke, dust, fumes, gas, odor, mist, vapor,
pollen, or any combination thereof.").
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in the open air, other than uncombined water or air!" 3a The definition
recommended by the proposed model regulations tended toward
specificity: "Air contaminant shall mean dust, fumes, mist, smoke,
other particulate matter, vapor, gas or any combination thereof!'"
The definition finally adopted is even more specific. It unnecessarily
adds "odorous substances,'" although odors are gases.
The scope of definitions of "air" as it affects the air pollution
control agency's jurisdiction over air inside buildings or other enclosures
is important. This air is traditionally under the regulation of the De-
partment of Health and/or the Department of Industrial Hygiene.
New York State's definition of "outer air" contains the traditional
limitations." New York City's Code also contained a definition of
open air which confined the agency's jurisdiction to outside air." In
the fall of 1971, the definition was broadened to include "all the air
available for human, animal, or plant respiration, but shall not include
the air in equipment and private dwellings!' The major purpose of
the revision was to include the polluted air in subway stations and
tunnels within the agency's jurisdiction. The proposed model regu-
lations do not include a definition of "air," "open air," or "outer
air,"" leaving problems of agency jurisdiction to be worked out
locally.
Many other terms are generally defined, and any particular defi-
nition may be crucial in a given case. The foregoing discussion is
limited to a few seemingly innocuous terms which have great impact
on an enforcement agency's jurisdiction and powers, and the ultimate
success of the law. It is intended merely to be illustrative of the prob-
lems caused by inattention to definitions, to urge particular care in
defining such terms as "air pollution," "air contaminant" and "air."
III. EMISSION STANDARDS
Most substantive provisions of present air pollution control laws
regulate air pollution by prohibiting the emission from a particular
source of a named pollutant in a greater quantity than a specified
amount or density. The principal traditional regulatory technique is
the application of smokestack emission standards, despite the fact
that very few stack emissions are mechanically monitored." Theo-
as New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, 1403.2-1.03(c) (Supp. 1971).
84 36 Fed. Reg. 6687 (1971).
86 Id. at 22414.
se 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regs. § 175.3(1) (1964). "'Outer air.' All space outside of
buildings, stacks or exterior ducts,"
rt New York City Admin. Code ch. 41, § 892-2.0 (1971).
88 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-1.03(ff) (Supp. 1971).
BD 36 Fed. Reg. 6687 (1971).
40 Although some large utility or industrial stacks may be monitored, small sources
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retically, hundreds of thousands of stacks scattered over a given juris-
diction are to be kept under regular observation by air pollution
inspectors.
It is generally assumed that the wider the range of pollutant
emission standards and the stricter the standards, the more likely it
is that a jurisdiction will be seriously committed to air pollution con-
trol and that enforcement efforts will result in less air pollution. One
can learn little, however, about commitment and the effectiveness of
even a law with tough standards without first examining the law's
underlying operating assumptions and the jurisdiction's enforcement
program. Tough standards and broad coverage, as well as the pres-
ence of environmental pressure groups with political influence, dem-
onstrate a serious concern with air pollution but do not indicate
whether laws are either enforceable or enforced. A gap between emis-
sion standards and enforceability is revealed when standards depend
for enforcement upon an inspector's personal observation of a smoke
plume at the place where the equipment normally operates and are
unenforceable unless the number of emission sources is manageable
in relation to the available number of field and other enforcement
personnel. What constitutes a manageable number of sources depends
in turn upon the quantity of resources committed to air pollution con-
trol and the distribution of the resources within the agency. In cases
where the number of pollution sources is extremely high, as in New
York City, it is quite improbable that within the foreseeable future
there will ever be sufficient resources to regulate pollution emissions
at the source. And, even if the moneys were available, policing mass
numbers of sources to enforce emission standards is an inefficient and
ineffective regulatory technique.
A. Smoke Emission
Smoke emission laws are a classic illustration of the failure of
emission standard regulation as a major control technique. The typical
statutory provision prohibits or restricts for a specified time period
the emission of smoke or visible emissions of a shade or density equal
to or darker than a specified number on the Ringelmann Chart, a
chart used to measure the darkness of emissions. 41 The provision may
and most major ones are not. For example, Consolidated Edison recently entered into an
agreement with the New York City Department of Air Resources to install system-wide
smoke and nitrogen oxide monitoring equipment by the end of 1972. N.Y. Post, Mar. 14,
1972, at 10, col. 8.
41 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.03 (Supp. 1971), where
it is stated:
(a) No person shall cause or permit the emission of air contaminant of:
(1) A density which appears as dark as or darker than No. 2 on the
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be applicable to specified sources such as incinerators and fuel
burners" or to "any single source." The lattbr is recommended by
the proposed model regulations," which define "source" to include
"property, real or personal, or person contributing to air pollution.'
In more sophisticated laws, the opacity of the air contaminant emis-
sion, as well as its density, may be expressly prohibited or restricted. 4°
The opacity of air contaminant is measured by comparing it to the
various densities of smoke shown on the Ringelmann Chart, and it
has been held that this method for measuring the opacity of air con-
taminants of a hue different from gray is not unconstitutionally vague
under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 47 In
addition, the point at which the emission shall be measured may or
may not be specified."
standard smoke chart or of an opacity which obscured vision to a degree
equal to or greater than smoke of No. 2 density on the standard smoke
chart; or
(2) A density which appears as dark or darker than No. 1 on the
standard smoke chart, but less than No. 2 on said chart, or of such opacity
as to obscure vision to a degree equal to or greater than smoke of No. 1
density on the standard 'smoke chart, but less than No. 2 on said chart, if
such an emission continues for longer than 2 minutes in the aggregate in
any 60 minute period.
(Standard smoke chart refers to Ringelmann Chart).
42 See, e.g., 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regs. § 191.2 (1969), which prescribes different
smoke emission standards for combustion equipment put into operation before and after
February 1, 1967; section 194.5 sets forth different smoke emission standards for incin-
erators installed before and after January 26, 1967; section 189 Iays down different smoke
emission standards for by-product coke plants depending on five specified conditions. N.J.
Air Pollution Control Code ch. 4, § 2.1 (1971), prescribes standards for fuel-burning
equipment; section 3.2 sets forth standards for incinerators.
43
 See, e.g., Los Angeles County, Cal., Air Pollution Control District, Rules and Regs.,
Rule 5 (1972).
44 36 Fed. Reg. 6691 (1971) recommends:
Visible emission restrictions for stationary sources.
(a) No person will discharge into the atmosphere from any single source
of emission whatsoever any air contaminant of a shade or density equal to
or darker than that designated No. 1 in the Ringelmann Chart or 20 per-
cent opacity.
(b) A person may discharge into the atmosphere from any single source
of emission for a period or periods aggregating not more than 3 minutes in
any 60 minutes air contaminants of a shade or density not darker than
No. 3 on the Ringelmann Chart of 60 percent opacity.
45 Id. at 6687. The breadth of the definition of "source" was such that the restriction
of visible emissions appeared to include cigarette, pipe and cigar smokers I Apparently this
potential problem was called to the attention of the EPA because the adopted definition
omits the language "or person." Id. at 22406.
48
 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-0.03 (Supp. 1971).
47 People v. PIywood'Mfrs. of California, 137 Cal. App. 2d 859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Union Oil Co. v. California, 351 U.S. 929 (1956).
48 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.03(b) (Supp. 1971):
The density of opacity of an air contaminant shall be measured at the point of its
emission, except: (1) When the point of emission cannot be readily observed, it
may be measured at an observable point on the plume nearest the point of
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Smoke control is'the oldest and the most widespread of the air
pollution control laws. It was the first kind of emission to be regu-
lated." Today, every locality that has an air pollution control law
limits to some degree the emission of smoke from some or all possible
sources. In the New York metropolitan area the emission of smoke or
visible air contaminant as measured by the Ringelmann Chart is
limited to varying degrees by New York State," New York City,"
New Jersey,52
 Nassau County," Westchester County," and some New
Jersey cities and counties." The proposed model regulations suggest
the control of smoke emissions in the traditional manner," despite the
fact that traditional law and widespread enforcement efforts over a
substantial period of time have failed to restrain the emission of smoke
or other visible emissions in the New York-New Jersey and other
metropolitan areas.
The failure of local smoke control laws is due primarily to the
fact that the regulatory technique and the nature of the violation pre-
clude systematic control of large numbers of emission sources. A
standard-setting regulatory technique permits the polluter to use pol-
luting materials and equipment provided that he stays within the
emission, or (2) In the case of air contaminant emitted from a source outside
of New York, it shall be measured after the plume crosses the jurisdictional
boundary of New York City.
40
 Smoke control was the first kind of emission to be regulated. The first general
smoke control ordinance in the country was adopted in Chicago in 1881. Cincinnati fol-
lowed in 1891, St. Louis in 1893, and the City of Brooklyn in 1895. In New York City,
smoke emissions of varying densities have been prohibited for about eighty years. In 1952,
the New York City Department of Air Pollution Control was established. Rules and regu-
lations were enacted two years later. For four years prior to the establishment of the
Department of Air Pollution Control, from 1948 to 1952, smoke control was enforced by the
Bureau of Smoke Control, a division of the Department of Buildings. Interview with
Alfred Pieratti, former Executive Director of Engineering and Enforcement of the New
York City Dep't of Air Resources, April 12, 1971. -
Early cases indicate that the New York City Department of Health, which had juris-
diction at the time, actively attempted to enforce the smoke law from the turn of the
century to World War I, and from the 1930's to the outbreak of World War II. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Newman v. Murray, 174 Misc. 251, 19 N.Y.S.2d 902 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct.
1940) ; People v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489 (1939) ; People
v. New York Edison Co., 159 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707 (1913) ; People v. New York
Central & Hartford R.R., 159 App. Div. 329, 144 N.Y.S. 699 (1913) ; Department of
Health v. Ebling Brewing Co., 78 N.Y.S. 11 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1902).
5° 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regs. § 191.2 (1969).
51
 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.03 (Supp. 1971).
52 N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 4, § 2.1 (1971).
53 Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Code § 9-21.42 (1971).
54
 Westchester County, N.Y., Sanitary Code art. 16, § 1614 (1971).
58 See, e.g., East Orange, N.J., Ordinance 12, § 4 (1964) ; Newark, NJ., Ordinance
65 A, § 5 (1958).
56
 36 Fed. Reg. 6691 (1971). In the adopted emissions limitations it is stated, follow-
ing the smoke control provision, that, "MU, limitation would generally eliminate visible
pollutant emissions from stationary sources." Id. at 22406.
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standard. Moreover, the burden is upon the enforcing agency to find
and observe the violation. In the case of a smoke emission, violations
are evidenced by a dark plume which usually occurs only irregularly.
Unlike water pollution, emissions into the air are rarely continuous,
and to catch the polluter in the act of violating the law is extremely
difficult." Systematic smoke-inspection systems thus tend to be time-
consuming and haphazard. In addition, compliance with an air pol-
lution control code is not a finite, discrete act. Even good equipment
with a control mechanism will pollute unless it is properly maintained,
operated, and repaired; the need for regular, frequent inspections
thus arises." It should be noted that licensing does not eliminate this
need."
As a primary means of enforcement, smoke emission laws are
inefficient and consequently expensive. However, where the pollution
sources are of a manageable number, these laws are a useful supple-
mentary enforcement technique, and they are also useful for agency
crackdowns against large polluters. Even for supplementary uses,
however, the enforcement of smoke emission standards requires ade-
quate inspectorial and back-up clerical staff - to spot-check sources
during the regular working day as well as at night and during week-
ends and holidays. Fuller development and required •
 use of scanning
and monitoring technology will make possible such continuous moni-
toring.
B. Particulate Matter Emissions
Particulate matter is the major visible ingredient of smoke," and
indirect efforts to control the emission of particulates date back to
early laws on smoke and open fir'es. Since these indirect methods
failed, New York City decided in 1964 to attack the matter directly.
It adopted two types of regulations: the first required reasonable pre-
cautions with respect to activities which cause quantities of visible
particulates to become airborne (e.g., building construction and de-
molition);" the second type restricted by weight the quantity of par-
57
 Conversations with New York City and New Jersey air pollution control personnel.
as Id.
Even with a licensing and effluent charge system, "constant inspection" is required
to avoid cheating in the Ruhr Valley, which contains the world's most successful water
pollution control system. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1971, at I, col. 8.
50
 In the recommended emissions limitations adopted by the EPA and the proposed
model regulations, smoke control is classified under the heading "Control of Particulate
Ethissions" and the subheading "Visible Emissions." 36 Fed. Reg. 6691 (1971).
61
 The New York City provision reads: "No person shall cause or permit particulate
matter to be handled, transported or stored without taking such precautions as may be
ordered by the administrator to prevent particulate matter from becoming airborne." New
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ticulate matter which might lawfully be emitted from fuel burning
equipment, incinerators, and process equipment." The federal recom-
mended model regulations included both categories, and they are re-
tained in the adopted regulations." In the metropolitan area, New
York State and New Jersey have adopted the second type of regu-
lation.e4
In New York City, the principal sources of airborne dust, which
are the targets of the first type of regulation noted above, are con-
struction and demolition activities. The law requires that persons en-
gaged in these polluting activities observe those operating procedures
specified, in the legislation for minimizing the emission of dust. Since
the polluting activities themselves are legal, a substantial burden is
placed on the enforcing agency to check the activities in order to spot
violations of operational standards and to induce compliance with the
law. In New York City the responsible agency does not spot-check
the pollution sources because it lacks sufficient manpower. As a con-
sequence, summonses have rarely been served for violation of the
airborne-dust laws." Instead, control of dust in New York City has
depended entirely on industrial self-regulation. Industry agreed to
adopt and carry out procedures to minimize airborne dust." Many of
these procedures are specified in the federal proposed and adopted
model regulations."
York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.11 (Supp. 1971) (most of this section is de-
voted to asbestos spraying).
62 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.23, formerly New York City Air
Pollution Code § 9.09 (1964). The new section covers less equipment than did the old
section. The former applies to "equipment installed or altered after the effective date of
this section," which includes old incinerators and fuel burners using residual oil because
they are required by law to be altered, but would not include old process equipment or
fuel burning equipment using light oil. The old code covered all equipment, old, new,
altered and unaltered. However, the new section contains a broader coverage of par-
ticulates, including gas and liquid particulates, as well as solids.
65 36 Fed. Reg. 22406 (1971).
64 See, e.g., N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch, 5, § 2 (fuel burning equipment) ; ch.
7, § 2 (manufacturing processes) ; ch. 11, § 3 (incinerators) (1971) ; 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules
& Regs. § 202.2 (fuel burning) ; I 194.4 (incinerators) ; § 187.3 (process equipment gen-
erally); § 188.3 (ferrous jobbing foundries) ; § 195.3 (cement and lightweight aggregate
industry pyro-process) (1971). •
65 Interview with Alfred Pieratti, supra note 49. The following indicates the serious-
ness of New York City's airborne dust problems:
Demolition dust, including old asbestos, is a serious source of air pollution. Did
you know that in 1968 about 4,000 buildings were demolished in the City? The
same for 1969, and we anticipate a twenty five to thirty percent increase of that
figure if proposed housing programs go ahead. The dust is so bad that you can
sometimes get a number 3 or 4 Ringelmann reading from the dust.
It should be noted that such a reading would indicate black smoke. Interview with Harold
Romer, Assistant Commissioner,.New York City Air Resources Department, Jan. 25, 1971.
66 Interview with Harold Romer, supra note 65.
67 36 Fed. Reg. 6692, 22406 (1971).
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It can reasonably be assumed that compliance with airborne dust
procedures is low, given the low rate of compliance with pollution
control laws generally and the fact that New York City's air continues
to contain particulates from many sources substantially in excess of
federal and state standards."' What proportion of New York City's
particulates result from construction and demolition activities is not
known with any certainty. Except in the controlling of asbestos dust,
the law has received little attention, primarily because other control
activities demand priority. The airborne dust regulation is an example
of New York City's tendency to enact many laws regulating all of the
known pollutants without paying close attention to the feasibility of
enforcing the particular law.
The legislative technique of regulating operating procedures in
order to control dust emissions is expensive for the enforcing
agency if the sources are numerous. Draftsmen of air pollution mea-
sures who are seeking to eliminate airborne dust from construction
and demolition activities must first consider the feasibility of patrol-
ling the numerous sources of such dust in light of available funds and
manpower. If these logistical resources are insufficient to provide for
effective patrolling of numerous sources of dust pollution, a law focus-
ing on mandatory operational procedures will be, as the New York
City experience shows, of little avail. Other alternatives must be con-
sidered and weighed. Control of specific types of equipment might be
useful in modifying dust emission."
These alternatives require technological investigation and a bal-
ancing of social and economic factors peculiar to the locality con-
cerned. Without a realistic appraisal of available resources and
careful consideration of alternative solutions, the danger of passing
an unenforceable law is grave. It should be noted that such unen-
forceable laws not only are ineffective in abating pollution, but indeed
harm antipollution efforts because their existence creates a false sense
of security among persons interested in the environment and thus dis-
courages passage of more effective measures.
The second type of particulate matter emission restrictions—
which forbids, by weight, specific quantities of pollutant emissions
68 E.g., the citywide annual average readings for suspended particulates (compiled on
a fiscal year) are as follows: 1968-69 — 96.2 µg/m8 (micrograms per cubic meter of air) ;
1969-70 — 104.8 {cg/ma; 1970-71 — 106.6 ii.g/m 2 (an increase of 7% in two years). The
minimum federal standard is 75 µg/ma annual average.
Recently issued dustfall data for 1971 provide, for the first time, a basis for com-
parison with New York State air quality standards (there are no federal standards for
dustfall) ; on an annual basis only 16% of the monthly measurements may exceed .90
mg/cm2/mo. In 1971, 31% of the readings exceeded that standard (the peak reading was
4.19 mg/ant/mo. in the borough of Manhattan).
°° SCC discussion of regulation of sulfur fuel equipment in text at notes 130-35 infra.
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froth a specified source—depends upon administration of stack tests
to'determine whether operating equipment is emitting excessive par-
ticulates. However, stack tests are extremely expensive," and the
available instruments for conducting stack tests are not accurate."
Consequently the law has never been enforced in New York City,
except to test a prototype of new equipment." New Jersey, on the
other hand, enforces the law with respect to operating equipment by
using a mathematical guide designed to gauge probable (expected)
particulate matter emission, as well as by testing the equipment in
some cases." In an administrative hearing involving excessive par-
ticulate matter emissions from a ferrous foundry, the agency justified
its use of the guide by stating that "there are several thousand stacks
in New Jersey and it would be impractical to test them all. It would
take many•_years, and be very expensive both for the state and the
company involved."" The validity of the guide has never been liti-
gated in the courts, but in at least one instance its results have proved
remarkably accurate." Expanded use of this guide, or the develop-
ment of other guides, should be explored as a useful enforcement tool
in the absence of reasonable and reliable instrumentation.
In the absence of relatively inexpensive and accurate measuring
instruments or the use of a substitute guide, a particulate emission
law such as New York City's is a useless regulatory technique. In-
dustry must be required to self-monitor at specified intervals and to
forward the results under oath to the agency. Presumably, then, the
law will create a market for the development of accurate instruments.
However, even this development will not solve particulate emission
problems as long as the technology remains excessively expensive.
Only major industries and power plants—rather than every fuel-
burning, refuse-burning, or small manufacturing source—will be able
70 Statement by Robert Rickles, former New York City Air Control Commissioner,
Executive Seksion, New York City Council Committee on Environmental Protection, May
7, 1971.
71 See, e.g., Bus. Week, Jan. 29, 1972, at 84.
72 Rickles Statement, supra note 70.
73 Interviews with Herbert Wortreicb, Chief Enforcement Officer, Bureau of Air Pol-
lution Control, N.J. Dep't of Environmental Protection, September 13, 1968, and February
8, 1972. See, e.g., Shamoon Industries, Inc. v. Dept. of Health, 93 N.J. Super. 272, 225
A.2d 699 (1966), for an example of a case using the mathematical guide.
74 Hearings on Application of Universal Rundle Corp. Before the N.J. Dep't of
Health, May 18, June 8, 9, 22,.23, July 20, 21, August 4, 1967. (At that time, the Air
Pollution Control Agency was part of the State Department of Health.) When the stack
emissions of Universal Rundle were actually tested, it was found that the estimate of
particle matter emission using the state's mathematical guide was accurate within a one
to two percent margin of error. Wortreich, supra note 73.
75 Interviews with Herbert Wortreich, supra note 73. Cf. Bus. Week, Jan. 29, 1972,
at 84, for a discussion of some of the problems that may be encountered in using "esti-
mates" of quantities of particulate matter discharges in pollution control litigation.
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to afford mechanical monitoring. The numerous small sources, which
together contribute substantially to pollution, will need to be eliminated
or consolidated wherever possible.
C. Visible Emission from Motor Vehicles
Although smoke emission laws are generally applied only to
stationary sources, they may also be applied to mobile sources such
as motor vehicles. Some jurisdictions also specifically regulate, in a
variety of ways, the emission of air contaminants from motor vehicles
as part of their air pollutant control regulations." For many years
quite a few jurisdictions have also prohibited the emission of smoke
from motor vehicles under their vehicle safety and traffic laws." Al-
though under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 the federal govern-
ment has preempted regulation of new motor vehicles," it leaves
regulation of used motor vehicles and engines to state and local govern-
ments."
The proposed model regulations suggest the enactment of a two-
standard visible emission provision applicable to motor vehicles: first,
for gasoline-powered engines a time limit of five consecutive seconds
is suggested for any visible emission;" second, for diesel-powered
engines the same time limit is suggested for an emission darker than
No. 1 on the Ringelmann Chart. 81 New York City's law, on the other
hand, does not distinguish between gasoline- and diesel-powered en-
gines. It prohibits visible emissions from any "internal or external
combustion engine of a motor vehicle, while the vehicle is stationary,
for longer than ten consecutive seconds" and from "a motor vehicle
after the vehicle has moved more than ninety yards from a place where
the vehicle was stationary."' New York City also restricts motor-
vehicle engine idling."
78 See, e.g., N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 14, § 2 (1971) (applying only to
diesel-powered motor vehicles) ; N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law 375(28) (McKinney
1971) ; 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regs. § 192 (setting control equipment and emission stan-
dards for motor vehicles manufactured and'assembied after June 30, 1967), § 193 (setting
smoke emission control standards for diesel-powered motor vehicles) (1967) ; Nassau
County, N.Y., Admin. Code ft 9-21.40, .56 (1971) (restricting idling of motor vehicle
engines) ; New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, * 1403.2-9.05 (Supp. 1971) (limiting
visible air contaminants from internal combustion engines).
77 See, e.g., Cal. Vehicle Code § 27153 (West 1971) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-80(c)
(1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 68-1717 (Supp. 1971) ; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 90, § 16 (Supp.
1971) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 483A48 (1969).
78 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(a) (1970).
78 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(c) (1970).
80 36 Fed. Reg. 22406 (1971).
81 Id.
82 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.05 (Supp. 1971).
88 Id.
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Regardless of how the law is drafted, all of the foregoing legisla-
tive provisions rely for their enforcement upon the maintenance by the
agency of a system of routine street policing of the moving or idling
emission sources. The burden of maintaining such a program is clearly
far greater than the responsibility for routinely spot-checking stationary
sources. The sources are mobile and number in the millions, while
stationary sources number in the thousands or tens of thousands.
As a result of the magnitude of the burden of inspection, this law
generally has not been enforced in the New York-New Jersey metro-
politan area." The police might partially enforce it but generally
do not. 8° New York City air pollution control inspectors enforce motor
vehicle emission laws on a haphazard basis "whenever we see a smoking
car," and "when there are crackdowns." 8° With police cooperation, and
the allocation of resources adequate to the task, some degree of sys-
tematic enforcement is certainly possible. One viable method of en-
forcement would be the posting of inspectors at bus terminals, truck
routes, taxi stands, and garages. However, not much progress can be
made by the enforcement of present visible emission laws with respect
to motor vehicles.
The principal purpose of such a law is to control old or badly
maintained vehicles that emit visible smoke and suspended particu-
lates. However, the dangerous pollutants emitted are invisible to the
naked eye—i.e., carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, hydrocarbons, and
miniscule lead particulates." The dangerous invisible pollutants are
84 A record of New York information is available by county: Westchester County,
ten estimated summonses in 1970; Rockland County, one summons in 1970; Suffolk
County, no summonses in 1970; Nassau County, 1,335 summonses in 1970 for violation of
county motor vehicle emission law (Nassau County Admin. Code §§ 9-21.40, .56 (1971).
Data compiled from Local Air Pollution Control Agency Information Forms, submitted to
the EPA as part of grant application. New York City, 352 summonses in 1968, 69 sum-
monses in 1969, three summonses in January 1970, Interview with Alfred Pieratti, supra
note 49; some information concerning New Jersey enforcement experiences is also avail-
able. In June 1971, a rule prohibiting excessive smoke from diesel engines was enacted,
N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 14, § 2 (1971), and in the succeeding six months
about 1,500 summonses were issued by the state police, not by the New Jersey Environ-
mental Protection Agency. Local police did not cooperate in the program. Before June
1971, the state law prohibiting dark or offensive emissions from a motor vehicle was not
enforced. Conversation with Paul Arbesman, EPA Regional Officer, Region II, in charge
of New Jersey, March, 1972.
85 With the exception of the above six months' experience in New Jersey, the police
do not generally enforce auto emission laws, and even in New Jersey the local police did
not cooperate. Conversation with Paul Arbesman, supra note 84.
86 Interview with Alfred Pieratti, supra note 49. In Nassau County during fiscal
1970, of 2,590 violations cited, 1,335 were for vehicle emissions, 500 were for "nuisance,"
155 for open burning, and 600 for smoke. Local Air Pollution Control Agency Information
Forms filed with the EPA for the 1970 grant period.
87 See Calhoun, Report to New York City Council: The Control of Automotive Air
Pollution in New York City, Yale Legislative Service (1970).
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therefore reduced by enforcement of this law only insofar as they are
reduced by proper maintenance of vehicles, especially of older vehicles.
Assuming the difference to be substantial, the law would be meaningful
only if its enforcement led to proper maintenance of the vehicle—a
questionable result, since there are no data showing that fines alone
are an adequate way to ensure good maintenance. In a somewhat com-
parable and more thoroughly studied situation in New York, housing
maintenance, fines have not succeeded in bringing about proper main-
tenance." Even if a fine exceeds the cost of repairing the particular
violation, therefore inducing the violator to make the particular repair
rather than pay the fine, there is no evidence that the fine will also
cause a violator thereafter to maintain good housekeeping practices.
The cost of general maintenance as opposed to a specific repair, the
chances of getting caught again, the problem of inducing change in a
pattern of established habits, and the ability of members of lower
economic classes in society (older cars are generally owned by poorer
people) or of marginal businesses to undertake additional expenses, are
all factors which will influence the owner's decision concerning general
maintenance.
Regulations restricting visible and invisible emissions from motor
vehicles will, of course, comprise a useful supplementary enforcement
tool in the near future when motor vehicles contain the control equip-
ment required by the Clean Air Amendments and are powered by a
relatively non-polluting fuel." The checking would be done routinely
at annual state motor vehicle inspections." However, it is suggested
that the law must be made viable by the following means: the inspec-
tion must be conducted by the state rather than private 'garages; a
technical means of measuring the pollutant emission rapidly and accu-
rately must be developed; control equipment must be developed which
will operate efficiently, without maintenance, for a period equivalent to
88 For excellent studies regarding housing maintenance, see, e.g., Castrataro, Housing
Enforcement; A Century of Failure in New York City, 14 N.Y.L.F. 60 (1968) ; Grad,
Final Report of the Study of Housing Maintenance and Enforcement May 18, 1964-June
30, 1967, Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia University (1967).
89 36 Fed. Reg. 15486 (1971). The introduction to this section states:
In the comments submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency following
publication of the notice of proposed rule-making, many questions were raised
about ... transportation control measures. The Environmental Protection Agency
is engaged in the preparation of information to assist States in employing such
measures in their programs for attainment and maintenance of the national am-
bient air quality standards. There will be included, among other things, infor-
mation on the extent to which motor vehicle inspection programs and emission
control devices applicable to in-use motor vehicles can be expected to contribute
to improvements in ambient air quality.
90 New Jersey is the first state to have already initiated an annual exhaust emission
check-up. The program began in 1972. Bus. Week, August 7, 1971, at 26.
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about one year's driving; and the necessary repairs must be made
before the vehicle may be driven again.
D. Emission of Hazardous Air Pollutants
The EPA has suggested stack sampling as a major technique in
controlling the emission of the two hazardous pollutants beryllium and
mercury 91
 A hazardous air pollutant is defined by the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 as "an air pollutant to which no ambient air qual-
ity standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Adminis-
trator may cause, or contribute to, an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.""
In December 1971, the EPA published its first proposed national emis-
sion standards for hazardous pollutants." The pollutants include asbes-
tos, beryllium, and mercury. Following public hearings, the EPA must
adopt emission standards, unless the pollutants are found to be "clearly
. . . not . . . hazardous."° 4 The latter is improbable because of the sub-
stantial medical documentation indicating the serious hazard of pro-
longed or concentrated exposure to asbestos, beryllium, or mercury."
Beryllium emission standards are proposed for extraction plants,
machine shops, ceramic plants, propellant plantS; incinerators, and
rocket-motor test facilities." The EPA suggests that stacks be sampled"
at ninety-day intervals or that industry-operated networks sample
ambient air as the method of determining compliance." The proposed
mercury standards are applicable only to mercury-cell chlorakali plants
and primary mercury mines," although mercury actually emanates
from a wide variety of urban sources, including coal-fired power plants,
paint, primary non-ferrous smelters, incinerators, mercury processing
plants, and general laboratories and hospitals. 1" The only proposed en-
forcement technique is stack monitoring, also to be undertaken at sug-
91 36 Fed. Reg. 23244-45 (1971).
92 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(a) (1) (1970).
98 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1971), listing hazardous air pollutants. See also id. at 2340,
setting forth proposed standards.
94 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b) (1) (B) (1970). Promulgation of national emission standards
does not prevent states or local jurisdictions from adopting more stringent limitations. 36
Fed. Reg. 23242 (1971).
95 EPA Office of Air Programs Publication No. APTD-6753, Background Information
—Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Asbestos, Beryl-
lium and Mercury 3-5, 10, 15-16 (1971). For a discussion of the harmful effects of
mercury, see Council on Environmental Quality, Toxic Substances 12 (1971). For two
excellent articles on asbestos, see The New Yorker, October 12, 1968, at 117, and id.,
October 23, 1971, at 147.
96 36 Fed. Reg. 23243 (1971).
97 Id. at 23244.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 23245.
1-00 EPA Office'of Air Programs Publication, supra note 95, at 16.
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gested intervals of ninety days."' As discussed above,' local experi-
ence with stack sampling indicates that such programs are not enforced
because of the expense, inconvenience and inadequacy of present tech-
nology. Therefore, unless the beryllium and mercury emission control
Program stimulates technological development, and is'tinderwritten by
industry or the federal government, the state and local governments
will be unable to enforce the federal emission standards.
The propOsed asbestos emission standard is two-fold: first, reduc-
tion of the emission from mining, milling, manufacturing and fabricat-
ing operations, and second, prohibition of asbestos spraying for fire-
proofing and insulation.'" The latter is discussed later in this article
under the heading "Banning Activities of Fuels." The former sources
are regulated by requiring the use of industrial fabric cleaners 104 or of
other equally effective fire-proofing methods.'" In addition, elimination
of visible emissions is required.'" The enforcement of such emission
and operational standards will require substantial committment of
resources. Thus the effectiveness of the law will turn upon the feasibil-
ity of policing asbestos mining, milling, manufacturing and fabricating
operations."' The familiar problem of unenforceable legislation arises
again in the area of emission of hazardous air pollutants. Stack sam-
pling, suggested in the federal proposals, is not a viable technique due
to its enormous cost and the inadequate technology available. Replicat-
ing the federal proposals will therefore accomplish little in eliminating
hazardous air pollutants, and other alternatives must be considered.
E. Emissions That Affect Health or Welfare, or Are a Nuisance
Emission standards which depend for their enforcement on an
inspector's personal observation of violations are necessary in the first
place as a means of controlling obnoxious odors, because the nose is
still the best instrument for gauging the offensiveness of odors; and,
second, as a catch-all provision because air pollution control is a rap-
idly-changing area of public health that makes exhaustively inclusive
101 36 Fed. Reg. 23245 (1971).
102 See text following note 70 supra.
1°3 36 Fed, Reg. 23242 (1971). See also id. at 23207.
104 Id. at 23242.
105 Id.
106 Id,
to'r New York City explicitly restricts the emission of these hazardous pollutants,
and of cadmium, under specification clauses recently added to its "catch-all" provisions
protecting the health and general welfare. See text at notes 108-15 infra. Asbestos "emitted
from the brakelining of a motor vehicle during normal use" is exempt. New York City
Admin. Code ch. 57, $11 1403.2-9.01(a), (c) (Supp. 1971). These provisions were added
to the New York City Air Pollution Control Code in the fall of 1971, and they have not
been enforced.
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specific coverage an impossibility. A locality with any sort of air pollu-
tion control law usually has a general provision protecting the health
and general welfare of persons and property from the effects of air
pollution."
This provision is sometimes referred to as the "nuisance section"
because of its historical origin, even though it may not contain the
term "nuisance." In the majority of states, the use of the term "nui-
sance" in conjunction with protection of health and welfare may
cause confusion in interpretation. Violation of the provision does not
depend upon whether defendant's acts constituted a common law
nuisance.' The air contaminant emissions prohibited under such a
provision include odors—whethef or not explicitly specified—and in
fact the provision is used principally for the purpose of controlling
their emission."° Indeed, in smaller communities, and in many larger
ones, the nuisance provision, along with clauses prohibiting open
burning and smoke emissions, is often the most frequently enforced
air pollution control law. 111
 The section may also be drafted, as in
New York City's Code, to include those pollutants which are not
1°8 See, e.g., N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 6, § 2 (1971) ; 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules
& Regs. § 186 (1969) ; Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Code tit. D, cb. IX § 9-21.46 (1971);
Westchester County, N.Y., Sanitary Code art. 16, 1611 (1971).
109
 See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. George P. Ray Mfg. Co., 124 N.Y.S. 913 (Super. Ct.
Erie Co. 1910), where the court held that the violation of a Buffalo city ordinance similar
to provisions protecting health and welfare from the effects of air pollution did not depend
on whether the defendant's act constituted a common law nuisance. The court stated:
[Mere was no issue of a nuisance in the common law sense; it was a question
of whether the ordinance had been violated. The right to pass ordinances in
references to matters of police presupposes that there may be conditions which
would not constitute a common law nuisance, but which are, nevertheless, incon-
sistent with the rights of individuals and the public and the test of an ordinance
is not whether there is, in fact, a nuisance, but whether the ordinance is reason-
able. If it were necessary to establish the fact of a nuisance to convict one of a
violation of an ordinance, then there would be no need of the ordinance, for the
maintenance of a nuisance is unlawful at all times, and may be reached without
the aid of municipal ordinances.
Id. at 914. But see Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District, Rules and Regs., Rule 5
(1971), which prohibits the discharge of air contaminants "which cause injury, detriment,
nuisance or annoyance" or "which endanger the comfort, repose, health or safety."
110 Interview with Alfred Pieratti, former Executive Director of Engineering and
Enforcement of the New York City Department of Air Resources, April 12, 1971; Inter-
views with Herbert Wortreich, supra note 73. At the time of the first Wortreich inter-
view on September 13, 1968, 50% of air pollution complaints in New Jersey concerned
odors.
111 Experiences of some of New York's counties demonstrate this point: Westchester
County: of 243 violations cited, 149 were for violations of the "nuisance" regulation, 54
for smoke and 30 for open burning; Suffolk County: of 1,059 violations cited, 159 for
"nuisance," 650 for open burning and 250 for smoke; Rockland County: of 137 violations
cited, 75 for "nuisance," 40 for open burning, 22 for smoke; cf. Nassau County: of 2,590
violations cited, 500 for "nuisance," 155 for open burning, 600 for smoke, but 1,335 for
vehicle emissions. Data compiled from Local Air Pollution Control Agency Information
Forms filed with the EPA for 1970 grant period.
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harmful in themselves but which become harmful in combination with
other pollutants."' The more broadly and open-endedly this provision
is drafted, the more usefulness it may have for the enforcing agency.
The equivalent provision proposed by the federal model regula-
tions prohibits emissions "from a building or equipment in such a
manner or amount as to cause a nuisance or to violate any regula-
tion."'" In contrast, New York City's law prohibits emission which
"may cause detriment to the health, safety, welfare or comfort of any
person . . ." 1" The scope of the proposed model regulation was thus
restricted to the boundaries of a common law nuisance or to acts al-
ready prohibited by the regulations, and accordingly was deleted from
the adopted regulations."' Since the maintenance of a nuisance is un-
lawful, the sole purpose of the proposed regulation appeared to be to
empower the air pollution control agency to abate nuisances. This
section should be broadly drafted, as New York City's was, and
should not be drafted to be confined to or confused with common law
nuisance.
F. Sulfur Emissions
Beginning about 1964, the federal government, with local coop-
eration, albeit sometimes reluctant, became involved in a major drive
to control the emission of sulfur.'" The affected cities and states were
those whose air contained dangerous levels of sulfur dioxide and sus-
pended particulates."' These pollutants in combination were known
to have caused the death of thousands during the London air pollu-
112 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.01 (Supp. 1971).
113 36 Fed. Reg. 6692 (1971).
114 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.01 (Supp. 1971).
116 36 Fed. Reg. 22406 (1971).
116 At about that time HEW began preparing and making available the information
necessary to enact meaningful sulfur control limitations (see, e.g., Letters from Robert A.
Low, New York City Councilman, to Senator Maurice Newberger, June 22, 1964, and
from V.G. MacKenzie, Chief, Division of Air Pollution, to Senator Newberger, August 8,
1964) and encouraging the adoption by the New York City Department of Air Pollution
Control of the nation's first regulation limiting the sulfur content of fuel. (The author was
director at that time of the project to revise the New York City Air Pollution Code under
an HEW grant to the Columbia University Legislative Drafting Research Fund.)
117 New York City experienced a serious air pollution incident on October 20, 1963,
when sulfur dioxide and particulates reached dangerous levels. Greenburg, Air Pollution
Episode in New York City in 1963, Address Before 58th Annual Meeting of the Air
Pollution Association, Toronto, Canada, June 20-24, 1965. An earlier incident in 1953 had
received little attention. Greenburg, Report of an Air Pollution Incident in New York
City, November, 1953, 77 Public Health Report 7 (1962). The most well-known episode
occurred in 1966 during the Thanksgiving holidays and affected most of the eastern
United States. Researchers in New York City found an increase of 24 per day in the
death rate from November 24 . through 30, 1966. The HEW Public Health Service has
documented the incident in a booklet. Fensterstock & Fankhauser, Thanksgiving 1966 Air
Pollution Episode in the Eastern United States, NAPCA Publication No. AP-45 (1968).
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tion episodes of 1952, 1953 and .1962.' 18 In metropolitan New York'
and New Jersey, the principal source of sulfur dioxide is from the
burning of fuel for space heating and electrical power.'" New York
city,120 New Jersey"' and New York State"' successively enacted
laws to limit stringently the content of sulfur in fuel sold, bought or
used within the enacting jurisdiction.'"
An alternative method of restricting the emission of sulfur from
large boilers would be to require the sulfur dioxide to be removed from
the flue gases."' However, in the metropolitan area, the federal gov-
ernment urged the enactment only of restrictions on the sulfur content
of fuel. The flue-control equipment then available could be used only
in some electrical utility and industrial boilers, and moreover the
equipment was neither very efficient nor economical.' 25 Thus neither
118
 Fensterstock & Fankhauser, supra note 117, at 1: "Excess deaths over normal
expectancy ranged from 17 in Donora (Pennsylvania, 1948 incident) to 4,000 in the 1952
London smog." See also Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and Their Implica-
tions for Control, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 197 (1968).
its In New York City the estimated emission of sulfur dioxide by source in 1970 was
(in tons and percent per annum): residential and commercial space heating-190,200
(50%) ; power plants-160,000 (42%) ; transportation-20,400 (5%) ; industrial-6,860
(2%) ; and incinerators-2,100 (0.5%). Bureau of Technical Service, New York City
Department of Air Pollution Control, Emission Inventory Summary (1970). In metro-
politan New Jersey (the nine northern counties), the estimated emission of sulfur dioxide
by source in 1970 was (in percentages) ; power plants-45%; commercial and industrial
burning of fuel (mixed uses including space heating)-27%; residential space heating-
12%; industrial processes-9%; transportation-6%; and incinerators-1%. Conversa-
tion with Paul Arbesman, supra note 84.
120
 New York City Air Pollution Control Code § 13.03 (1964), as amended, New
York City Admin. Code ch. 41, § 893.1.0 (1971), as amended, New York City Admin.
Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-13.03 (Supp. 1971).
121
 N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 8 (sulfur from industrial sources) (1967) ;
ch. 10 (sulfur in fuels) (undated) ; ch. 10A (sulfur dioxide from coal combustion) (1968) ;
ch. 13, § 4 (air quality standard for sulfur dioxide) (1969). •
122
 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regs. § 200 (fuel composition and use—New York metro-
politan area) (1968), § 201 (fuel composition and use for heat or power generators)
(1969).
123
 New York State's present law applies only to New York City, Nassau and West-
chester Counties. Its applicability is limited to fuel buyers and users, and not to sellers.
A proposed amendment enlarges the geographic area covered to include, with specified
limitations, Suffolk County, and expands the prohibition to include sellers. State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation, Proposed amendments to 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules &
Regs. § 200.3, § 200.4 and § 200.5(f).
124
 Technical Comm. of the Nat'l Soc'y for Clean Air, Sulfur Dioxide: An Air
Pollutant, 16-17 (Great Britain, undated), issued at the meeting of the Clean Air Society
(Oct. 1971). See also 36 Fed. Reg. 22407 (1971).
128 Technical Comm. of the Nat'l Soc'y for Clean Air, supra note 124, at 17. It is
therein stated:
Despite much attention and research over many years, there is still no solution
that could generally be adopted for boiler plants, although sulfur recovery from
some smelter gases is practicable . The only full-scale commercial installa-
tions in the world (as distinct from experimental or pilot-scale plans) are the
water washing system for removing sulfur dioxide from the boiler flue-gases at
the Battersea and Barkside power stations in London. For reasons which will be .•
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the federal government nor the affected local and state jurisdiction had
any choice at the time as to the means of controlling sulfur, and ac-
tion had to be taken to prevent a public health disaster similar to the
three London episodes. Under these circumstances, effective legisla-
tion was enacted and enforced. The federal recommendation was effec-
tive. The sulfur fuel restrictions are the most successful pollution
provisions enacted by New York City and New Jersey in terms of
measurably improved air quality."' Of course, substitution of low or
non-sulfur (gas) fuels has had a significant impact on fuel supply
patterns. This was inevitable since the existing fuel supply and use
patterns were responsible for the emission of sulfur.
The federal proposed model regulations contain two provisions
relating to the sulfur content of fue1, 127 the substance of which has
been retained in the adopted regulations."' Both provisions avoid
federal responsibility for affecting fuel supply patterns. This is un-
fortunate in light of the documented success of the laws of New York
City, New York State and New Jersey, and the federal government's
active role in bringing about their passage. The first provision in the
adopted federal regulations, like New York's and New Jersey's, re-
stricts the sulfur content of fuel, but a caveat follows: "This language
is intended for application to small area sources, where fuel substitu-
tion is the only practical control method."' The second provision
applies to "large power and steam generating boilers, where installa-
tion of fuel gas cleaning systems is feasible,'" and recommends lim-
iting the emission of sulfur rather than restricting the sulfur content
indicated, it is unlikely that the processes used in these stations could be adopted
more widely • • . One of the main difficulties involved is the enormous volume
of gas that has to be treated . . • . Another important factor is that the washing
of flue gases ... [cools the gases] and the chimneys emit a wet plume the density
of which is always low and can sometimes be negative so that the plume tends to
sink to ground level.
The foregoing view is more pessimistic than that of the EPA. See 36 Fed. Reg. 22407
(1971).
126 Monitoring as well as emissions data indicate that there is substantially less
sulfur dioxide in the air. It is reported that in the past three years sulfur dioxide was
reduced by 50%. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1972, at 20, col. 1. The New York City monitoring
station with the highest annual average for sulfur dioxide in 1969 was .113 ppm; in 1970,
it was .101 ppm; and in 1971, it was .063 ppm, while the worst station in 1961 had an
annual average of .96 ppm. R. Rickles & E. Ferrand, Data Reports, Aerometric Network,
N.Y.C. Dep't of Air Resources, Fiscal 1969-70 and 1970-71. Federal air quality standards
for sulfur dioxide require .03 ppm annual average, so New York City still falls short of
federal standards. 36 Fed. Reg. 22384 (1971). See Blade & Ferrand, Sulfur Dioxide Air
Pollution in New York City: Statistical Analysis of Twelve Years, 19 A.P.C.A. Journal
873 (1969).
127 36 Fed. Reg. 6692 (1971).
128
 Id. at 22407.
120 Id. at 22401.
180 Id.
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of the fuel. An explanatory footnote states that present technology
will allow eighty-percent removal of sulfur oxides from combustion
gases of most existing large industrial and electric power boilers."' A
1971 amendment to the New York City Air Pollution Control Code
now prescribes sulfur emission standards for boilers with a capacity of
500,000,000 BTU's per hour or more, i.e., Consolidated Edison boilers,
giving the utility the options of using low sulfur fuel or of removing
the sulfur from the stacks.'"
Standards are recommended for small area sources in a qualified
footnote of the adopted regulations;'" standards are not recommended
for electrical utility boilers."' This omission is significant. These regu-
lations are the only ones in the proposed model and adopted regulations
not containing a recommended standard. An explanatory note states
that nationally applicable standards are not possible: "Availability of
low sulfur fuels varies from one area to another. In some areas, severe
restrictions on the sulfur content of fuels could have a significant im-
pact on fuel-supply patterns."'"
The EPA thus hedges on the vital issue of national fuel-supply and
use patterns, passing the responsibility to the states and localities. The
most favorable interpretation of this position is that the EPA prefers
the behind-the-scenes role it played in the New York-New Jersey
metropolitan area, when New York City took the lead by enacting
legislation which altered local fuel-supply patterns and stimulated
the development of technology for removing sulfur from the oil at the
refinery. However, the federal regulations fail to make any provi-
sion for federal prodding or-support of -local action, and so sug-
gest a less favorable interpretation of the EPA's position: that the
agency is dodging its responsibilities in leading the battle for the initi-
ation of an overall federal fuel policy designed to put the right fuels—
low sulfur oil and natural gas—into the heavily polluted metropolitan
areas. In any case, the regulations place the onus of controlling sulfur
emissions on state and local governments. Draftsmen will find little
guidance in the federal model regulations and should look to the fuel
181 Id. at 22407.
182 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.07 (Supp. 1971).
138 These standards provide:
In many areas of the country, regulations can be written requiring the following
fuel characteristics: distillate oil-0.1 percent sulfur; residual oil— O.3 percent
sulfur; bituminous coal-0.7 percent sulfur. Because residual oil generally is
obtained from overseas sources, its use is necessarily restricted to areas accessible
to water-borne transportation. There are limited tonnages of 0.7 percent sulfur
coal available at the present time but only in certain areas of the country.
36 Fed. Reg. 22407 n.1 (1971).
184 Id. at 22457.
188 Id.
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sulfur content restrictions of the New York City, New York State and
New Jersey.
In heavy industrial or paper pulp areas, where there is little fuel
burning or where natural gas is used as fuel, sulfur emissions may be
principally or entirely caused by industrial processes. In addition to,
or in lieu of, imposing fuel limitations, some regulations limit the
emission of sulfur from equipment other than boilers or other fuel-
burning equipment. Such regulations may be applicable to industrial
sources generally,'" refineries, 187 sulfuric acid plants,' sulfur recovery
plants,'" non-ferrous smelters' 4° or sulfite pulp mills.'" Sulfur emis-
sion restrictions with explicit and precise standards are recommended
by the federal model regulations.'"
G. Other Air Contaminant Emissions
The federal model regulations include a substantial number of
provisions designed to control the emission of hydrocarbons, carbon
monoxide and nitrogen oxides from stationary sources."' The provi-
sions contain equipment and activity regulations as well as emission
standards. Comparable provisions are not found in the air pollution
control laws of the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, with the
exception of New York City's new restrictions on nitrogen oxide
emissions,144
 and the sale or use of architectural coating containing a
photo-chemically reactive solvent."' Since the restrictions are new,
no general comment can be made yet concerning local experience with
these provisions.
IV. BANNING MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT OR ACTIVITIES
As a legislative technique, the banning of polluting materials,
equipment or activities has two principal advantages: first, the pollu-
tion source is totally eliminated, and, second, the enforcement burden
is substantially less than where the law allows conditional use upon
compliance with legal standards and requirements. The first advantage
is particularly important with respect to a highly toxic material such
as asbestos. The second advantage is important where the polluting
188 See, e.g., N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 8 (1967).
187
 See, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 22407 (1971).
188 See, e.g., id.
180 See, e.g., id.
14o See, e.g., id.
141 See, e.g., id.
142 Id.
143
 Id.
144 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.13 (Supp. 1971).
148 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.15 (Supp. 1971).
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sources are numerous and ,enforcement resources are limited. If en-
forcement measures are a limiting factor, then bypassing the need for
maintaining a large inspectorial bureaucracy whose purpose is to
monitor the pollutor's day-by-day activities may mean the difference
between an effective and an ineffective law.
The ban may encompass the purchase, sale, or use of the pollut-
ing equipment, material, or activity; or it may simply prohibit the
purchase or sale of the material or fuel. When, however, the prohibi-
tion is limited to an activity or the use of materials or equipment
without encompassing the purchase or sale of materials or equipment,
the advantages of this legislative technique will not be felt if repeated
spot-checking of emission sources is the only means of obtaining com-
pliance with the law. Where the prohibition encompasses purchase
and sale, as it usually does, then enforcement will be economical and
efficient, even where the emission sources are numerous, because the
agency can exercise its control at the relatively few points of pur-
chase and sale or storage. Prohibition of purchase or sale has an ad-
ditional advantage: a commercial violation is far easier to prove than
a use (or emission) violation. The occurrence of the former is gen-
erally regular and discrete, while that of the latter is generally irreg-
ular and transitory. More importantly, the commission of a commercial
transaction is likely to be a recorded event, the proof of which can be
established by documentary evidence, while .proof of a prohibited or
restricted use depends upon eyewitness testimony of an agency in-
spector.
Although prohibition of purchase or sale is a generally effective
legislative technique, problems may arise in the implementation and
enforcement of the legislation which will undermine its effectiveness.
The 'legislation will be widely defied if reasonably convenient and
economical alternatives are not simultaneously made available to en-
able people , to conduct activities which, aside from their pollution
potential, are socially acceptable or necessary (e.g., leaf or other waste
disposal, space heating, fireproofing of structural beams in high rise
construction, transportation, etc.). In addition, the legislation will not
be enforced if it is in direct conflict with other governmental policies
and commitments. The enforcing jurisdiction will favor that interest
having more immediate urgency or influence.
The first two prohibitions discussed in this section ban or restrict
an activity, and their enforcement has created inspectorial problems
similar to those encountered in the enforcement of standard-setting
legislation. The other sections concern legislation banning or restrict-
ing material or fuel by prohibiting their purchase, or sale.
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A. Open Burning
The prohibition of open burning is the oldest law in the United
States which bans an activity for the purpose of preventing air pollu-
tion. This law is found in nearly every jurisdiction having air pollu-
tion control legislation including, in the metropolitan area, New York
State,"° New York City,147 New Jersey," Nassau County,' and
Suffolk County," and is recommended by the propoied, but not the
adopted, model federal regulations.'" The model provision is drafted
in the traditional manner: "No person shall ignite, cause to be ignited,
permit to be ignited, or maintain any open fire except as follows 
....
"162
The exceptions include recreational fires as well as fires used to control
fires or pests or to train personnel.'"
The kinds of open fires which are the principal cause of air pollu-
tion are: leaf burning (unfortunately, meteorological inversions are
more common during the fall); dump fires, including garbage dumps,
auto dumps, scrapyard locationS, and the open burning of debris on
waterways such as New York Harbor; construction site fires (used in
the winter for warmth, and year-around for waste disposal); and
land-clearing fires. In the metropolitan area, success in controlling
these four types of open fires has been mixed. The number of potential
violators is very high, and where the burning is part of a routine dis-
posal system for which alternative means either are unavailable or are
comparatively inconvenient and expensive, the chances of success are
poor. For example, leaf burning in parts of Westchester County and
construction site fires in New York City continue unabated and, ap-
parently, unaffected by the law.'" Dump fires have been sought to be
controlled in New Jersey through the sanitary licensing laws rather
than the open burning ban." The latter requires that an inspector be
146 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules & kegs. § 190 (1971).
147 New York Admin. Control Code ch. 57, { 1403.2-9.17 (Supp, 1971).
148 N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 2 (1971).
140 Nassau County, N.Y., Admin Code tit. D, ch. IX, § 9-21.26 (1471).
150 Suffolk County, N.Y., Sanitary Code art. 10, 14 (1971).
151 36 Fed. Reg. 6691 (1971). This language was deleted in the adopted regulations.
Id. at 22406.
189 Id. at 6691.
153 Id.
154 Interviews with Calvin E. Weber, Director of Division of Environmental Sanita-
tion, Westchester County Department of Health (in charge of county air pollution. control
program), June 27, 1969 and April 14, 1972; interview with Alfred Pieratti, former
Executive Director of Engineering and Enforcement of the New York City Department
of Air Resources, April 12, 1971.
155 Interview with Theodore A. Schwartz, Esq., former N.J. Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral in charge of air pollution control, July 23, 1968. See also N.J. Sanitary Code ch. 8
(1971).
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at the dump at the time of the fire in order ,to establish a violation. In
addition, to convict under the open burning ban, the agency must prove
that the owner caused or allowed the fire.'" This is particularly diffi-
cult because dump fires in New Jersey' are frequently caused by
spontaneous internal combustion, which is not considered a violation
of the open burning ban.'" Land-clearing fires apparently continue
more or less unabated, and will obviously not be controlled by a blan-
ket prohibition relying on policing by air pollution inspectors. After
many years of federal prodding, open burning in the New York Harbor
was halted by the establishment of an alternate inexpensive disposal
system. -
Before significant progress can be made In open burning restric-
tions, inexpensive alternatives must be provided. Technological de-
velopment and action should be undertaken' before blanket bans are
imposed. Then the open burning prohibitions should be realistically
geared to the availability of alternatives. Otherwise, the inevitable re-
sult is the gap between the letter of the laws and their enforcement,
exemplified by the New York City, Westchester County and New
Jersey experiences.
A related, and equally common, provision prohibits night-time in-
cinerator burning. The provision was recommended by the proposed
model regblations but was later omitted.'" From an enforcement view-
point, this provision is the epitome of legislative unreality. Inspectors
are not employed during the prohibited hours. Therefore no one is
on duty to catch the violators (all-night mechnical scanners could be
used, but are not). Of all our laws, this one most sharply reflects the
gap between legislative visions of control and the realities of law
enforcement.
B. Use of Soft Coal for Space Heating Prohibited;
Sale, Purchase, and Use of High Sulfur Fuel Prohibited
A pragmatic view of enforcement is not the only criterion for
measuring the probable success of a law. In contrast to the night-time
incinerator provisions, the New York City laws prohibiting the use of
soft coal for space heating and prohibiting the purchase, sale, or use
of high sulfur fuel (oil and coal)"° are both realistically enforceable
188 N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 2, 1.1 (1971).
157 Interview with Theodore A. Schwartz, supra note 155. The provision banning
burning reads: "No person shall cause,• suffer, allow or permit the disposal of rubbish or
garbage or trade waste or buildings or structures by open burning." N.J. Air Pollution
Control Code ch. 2, § 1.1 (1971). -
158 36 Fed. Reg. 6691 (1971). The language was deleted in the adopted regulations.
Id. at 22406.
169 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, { 1403.2-13.09 (Supp. 1971).
100 New York City Admin. Code ch. 51, § 1403.2-13.03 (Supp. 1971).
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although in some cases social needs may impede enforcement. The
sources to be routinely inspected—the storage facilities of sellers of
coal and other high sulfur fuel—are few in number, and the nature
of the inspections are relatively simple and inexpensive.'" In both
cases, however, the initial job of convincing industry to comply was
not an easy one.'" Moreover, in the case of the soft-coal space heat-
ing ban, a social and political dilemma quickly became apparent: soft
coal is largely used for space heating in older marginal housing. Hence
the enforcing governmental entity viewed the foreseeable economic
effects of forced fuel and equipment changes as potentially detri-
mental to the City's poorer inhabitants, and the soft coal ban was
never enforced. Instead, the City made an agreement with the retail
coal sellers to purchase from their wholesalers only soft coal containing
a lawful sulfur content.'" Then, five years after its enactment, the
outright-ban law was repealed in favor of extensive provisions regulat-
ing the use of soft coal for space heating and prohibiting the expansion
of its use.'" As has been seen, such a legislative technique—regulating
the manner of conducting a polluting activity—is unenforceable with-
out substantial inspectorial resources. Effective regulation would re-
quire measures such as subsidization of lower economic classes
adversely affected. Since New York City lacks such resources, it is
apparent that the law will not be enforced. In short, the prohibition of
soft-coal use for space heating has revealed a social dilemma involving
a weighing of social priorities that often is characteristic of environ-
mental legislation. In contrast, in the case of the high sulfur fuel ban,
the City's varying and sometimes competing commitments and re-
sponsibilities did not conflict. Once industry agreed to comply and
business and production systems adjusted to the new law, compliance
became routine. Thus, prohibition of purchase and sale, as well as use,
181 In the case Of soft coal use, the violator is the user, not the purchaser or seller;
however, the law provided for a total ban of the coal by 1968, except for the purpose of
generating steam. Informal inspection of wholesale coal storage facilities might have been
arranged. Enforcement would undoubtedly have been facilitated by banning sales as well
as UM,
162
 In the.case of soft coal, action was instituted for an injunction against the en-
forcement of New York City .Admin. Code ch. 41, § 893-2.0 (1971), as amended, New
York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-13.09 (Supp. 1971), on the ground of unconsti-
tutionality. See, e.g., Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. City of New York, Index No. 00277
(N.Y.C. Super. Ct., Jan. 17, 1969).
188 Interview with Alfred Pieratti, supra note 154. There may be 600 to 1,000 resi-
dential users in the City, and its use "will naturally peter out. . . . [Bietween 1966 and
'71 an estimated 70,000 tons of soft coal was replaced by gas." Id. Soft coal is also used by
the New York City Board of Education, Police and Fire Departments in their older
buildings, and by Consolidated Edison. New Jersey also regulates the sulfur content of
coal. N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 10A, f 2 (1971).
184 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, §§ 1403.2-13.09(c), -5.05(b)(4) (Supp.
1971).
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of polluting materials has been empirically demonstrated as an effec-
tive enforcement measure.
C. Asbestos Spraying Prohibited
In December, 1971, the EPA published proposed federal regula-
tions establishing emission standards for asbestos. 18 ' In an urban en-
vironment lacking asbestos milling, manufacturing, or fabricating
industries, the principal source of asbestos pollution is the application
of asbestos fire-proofing and insulation by spraying."' In older cities
engaged in substantial building demolition activities, such as New
York City, the quantity of demolition dust containing asbestos is
expected to increase markedly as newer buildings are torn down.'"
The proposed federal standard for fire-proofing and insulation appli-
cations is to "ban ... the spray application of products that contain
asbestos". because "efforts to control emissions by the use of contain-
ment and good housekeeping practices have repeatedly failed . . . .
Asbestos-free substitute materials are available for both sprayed as-
bestos fire-proofing and high-temperature asbestos insulation."'"
In New York City, the spraying of asbestos "in or upon a building
or other structure during its construction, alteration or repair," is
prohibited as of February, 1972, "except if Permitted by a vari-
ance . . . ." 1" New York State is considering a similar provision.'"
The New York City law is the successful result of several years of
fighting, in court and out, with the building trades, following their
considerable procrastination and laxity in complying with agency
operating procedures designed to prevent the asbestos from becoming
165 36 Fed. Reg. 23242 (1971). See also 29 C.F.R. 0 1910 (1970), as amended, 36
Fed. Reg. 23207 (1971).
100
 See, e.g., The New Yorker, Oct. 23, 1971, at 148-49, where it is stated:
The first use in the United States of sprayed mineral fibre containing asbestos
as a fire-proofing agent occurred in 1958 in the erection of the Chase Manhattan
Bank, here in New York. . . . [Mast year asbestos fire-proofing was used in
considerably more than half the large multi-story office buildings constructed in
the United States. The process . . . is an extremely wasteful one. . . . [A]bout
twenty five percent of , the material fails to adhere. . . . [Three million pounds
. used in 1970 alone entered the atmosphere immediately ..
107 Interview with Harold Romer, Assistant Commissioner, New York City Air Re-
sources Dep't, Jan. 25, 1971.
108" EPA Office of Air Programs Publication APTD-6753, Background Information—
Proposed National Emission Standards for Haphazard Air Pollutants: Asbestos, Berylliufn
and Mercury 7 (1971). See 36 Fed. Reg. 23242 (1971).
169 New York City Admin. Code cit. 57, 1403.2-9.11(b) (Supp. '1971) .
170 State Department of Environmental Conservation, Proposed 10 N.Y. Codes,
Rules & Regs. 196 (1970—
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airborne."' Their uncooperative response harmed the construction
workers and may have harmed the general public. 172
The new law is only a qualified success, however, because it re-
flects what may be a serious political and economic compromise. Not
only the use of asbestos but also the spraying into the open air of any
fire-proofing material constitutes a hazard.'" New York City law con-
tains extensive protective housekeeping regulations that would reduce
such hazards, including the use of tarpaulins and vacuuming,'" but
they cannot be effectively enforced, and the protections have not been
widely used. No one knows with reasonable certainty whether the emis-
sion of the new asbestos substitutes will be harmful or not. The sub-
stitutes have been laboratory-tested but have never been widely used.
The construction industry was, however, able to persuade the New
York City Council and apparently the federal government, that it was
necessary to allow the use of spraying as a technique of application;
the older, and safe method of encasing the beams in concrete was too
expensive 148 Other non-spraying methods of applying fire-proofing
have now been developed.'" With alternative methods of application
available, the law should prohibit the spraying of fire-proofing ma-
terials as an unnecessary public health risk.
D. Sale, Purchase, or Use of Leaded Gasoline
Beginning on November 1, 1971, leaded gasoline was supposed to
be phased out of use in New York • City.177 The legislative goal for ex-
171 Interviews with Neil Fabricant, Esq., former General Counsel, New York City
Environmental Protection Administration, November 9, 1970, and with Douglas J. Kramer,
Esq., former Assistant to General Counsel Assigned to Air Resources, April 9, 1971. S6e
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1971, at 19, discussing La Monica v. Kretchmer, .a New York City
-Superior Court case denying a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City Environmental
Protection Administration from enforcing criminal proceedings and administrative sealing
on the grounds that the Air Pollution Control Code and the Air Pollution Control Com-
missioner's orders are unconstitutional and outside his authority.
172 Statement of Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, Chief, Division of Environmental Medicine,
City University Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Executive Session, New York City
Council, Committee on Environmental Protection, February 25, 1971.
178 Id.
174 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-9.11(e) (Supp. 1971).
176 In 1961, it was found that spraying fire-retarding asbestos on supporting beams
instead of encasing them in concrete cut costs by about 20%. In 1972, increased costs for
substitute spray materials, available or scheduled for introduction in the near future, range
from zero to a maximum of 15%. EPA, Office of Air Programs Publication APTD-6753,
supra note 168, at 8.
176 P. Brodeur, Asbestos and Enzymes 144 (1972).
177 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-2.13.11 (Supp. 1971). For excellent
studies on lead in the air, see State of Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality, A Study
of Environmental Pollution by Lead (1971) ; L. Tepper, Seven-City Study of Air and
Population Lead Levels, Interim Report (1971) (aVailable from the EPA). There is now
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elusive use of non-leaded gasoline is January 1, 1974. 78 The EPA
has set a date of January 1, 1978 for the use of low leaded gasoline. 17°
Compliance with New York City's law has been mixed.18° However,
when the EPA adopts its phased schedule restricting lead in gasoline,
the federal schedule and standards will preempt state and local regu-
lations, and enforcement will be in the hands of the EPA "unless State
prohibition or control is identical to the prohibition or control pre-
scribed by the Administrator." 181
V. EQUIPMENT OR OPERATOR LICENSING AND OTHER EQUIPMENT
STANDARDS
A. Equipment Licensing
Of the three widely used air pollution control legislative tech-
niques—emission standards, banning, and licensing—it appears that
licensing is the technique most favored by draftsmen. Licensing, like
emission standard legislation, allows the polluter freedom to continue
to use the polluting materials and equipment, provided the polluter
complies with initial license requirements. A licensing program is de-
signed to be preventive, and hence is similar in intended effect to laws
banning a type of fuel, material, or equipment. Before operating the
equipment the potential licensee must meet legislative standards, and
the burden is upon him to appear before and satisfy the licensing
agency of compliance with the law before a license will be issued.
A licensing program can greatly simplify prosecutions. A viola-
tion for failure to obtain a license is easy to prove, since it is a single
discrete omission and the burden is on the polluter to produce the
license record. On the other hand, showing a violation for failure to
comply with the conditions of a license may involve agency field in-
vestigation and eyewitness testimony. However, if the condition can
be structured to require the licensee to file reports concerning the
status of, or the emission from, the equipment, violation of the condi-
tion would be as easy to prove as the failure to obtain a license.
Licensing, then, is a very useful regulatory technique; however,
problems can arise in an air pollution control licensing program, most
of which have been encountered in New York City's extensive experi-
ence with such a program. These problems include the need for a
the possibility that lead-free gasoline may emit cadmium, a toxic metal. Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 7, 1972, at 7, col. S.
178 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, { 1403.2-2.13.11(a) (4) (Supp. 1971).
170 38 Fed. Reg. 1254-61 (1973).
180 Requests for variances from several oil companies have not yet been decided upon.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1971, at 41, col. 3.
181 42 U.S.C.	 1857f-6c(c) (4) (A) (1970).
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substantial bureaucratic staff; the practical results of enforcing by
means of license withdrawal or suspension; the need to leave room for
technical innovation even though the licensing program will necessarily
develop a bureaucratic tendency to favor equipment specification
standards; and the problems encountered in licensing equipment de-
signed and acquired in different time periods—new equipment in new
plants, altered equipment in existing plants, and old equipment in
existing plants.
The success of any sort of licensing system is dependent prin-
cipally upon adequate program funding rather than statutory verbiage.
Substantial funding is needed to support the engineering, inspection
and clerical programs essential to the success of a licensing program.
Applications must be expeditiously processed to encourage voluntary
compliance, the equipment must be checked by engineers, and a work-
able and efficient system must be designed to insure that equipment
installations and alterations come routinely to the agency's attention.
Without such programs, a licensing system is, as is shown by New
York City's experience, easily ignored."'
It should also be noted that a licensing program does not preclude
the need for a substantial inspectorial staff to spot-check equipment
regularly."' A licensee is responsible for operating and maintaining
the equipment so as not to exceed legislative pollution standards. Even
good equipment has a capability to pollute and hence must be properly
operated and maintained to restrict pollutant emissions. 184 The en-
forcement agency therefore must assume the burden of policing the
polluter's use of materials and equipment after the license is issued.
Thus effective agency control must occur at two operational levels—
one at the agency before licensing, and the other in the field at the
source of emission. Unfortunately, the expense of maintaining a suffi-
cient staff for these multiple operations may not be considered at the
time the legislation is enacted. Perhaps the legislature hopes that
money can be found once a program is under way, or that some kind
of licensing program is better than none at all. An inadequately funded
program, however, is far worse than no program at all, because it gives
182 Interview with Alfred Pieratti, supra note 154. There is "no way to check on
illegally installed incinerators (or other equipment), unless they happen to smoke. flow do
we know if someone puts in an incinerator unless they file for a permit?" Interview with
Benjamin C. Radzka, former Director of Industrial Processes Task Force, New York City
Bureau of Air Resources, April 21, 1971. Two months after licensing was required, it was
found that 80% of the inspected industries had failed to obtain a license for their industrial
equipment, boiler or incinerator.
188 Conversations with New York City and New Jersey air pollution control person-
nel, See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
184 See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
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the misleading appearance of an active air pollution prevention pro-
gram.
Since field operations are expensive to maintain, some licensing
programs provide for the issuance of permits valid only for a specified
term."' Other agencies issue permits which are valid indefinitely.'"
Periodic license renewal is the preferable technique because it brings
the polluter to the agency, rather than vice versa, and insures that the
equipment will be checked at least at the time of license renewal.
However, if the clerical and engineering staff to administer such a
program are not available, a renewable license program is another
impractical and meaningless law. If the resources are available, a
tradeoff occurs between a relatively costly program—the issuing of an
indefinite permit, which requires inspectorial as well as engineering
and clerical back-up--and a less expensive alternative, the issuing of
a renewable permit which requires some engineering and clerical back-
up, but fewer spot-check field inspections.
Another major problem inherent in an air pollution control licens-
ing program concerns enforcement. In practical fact, an air pollution
licensing violation is frequently unenforceable or very difficult to en-
force. The usual method of enforcement is to revoke or suspend the
license—a simple and effective technique. However, illegal air-pollut-
ing equipment is rarely shut down because to do so would create
undesirable social consequences involving housing, employment or elec-
trical power."' Consequently licensing is less effective as a legislative
technique for controlling air pollution than it ,
 is in enforcing other
laws where the results of a temporary or permanent shut-down of a
licensee in violation are less socially severe or less politically sensitive.
A common criticism of licensing programs is that they tend to
stifle innovation by imposing equipment design 'standards rather than
performance standards; this presents a problem to be considered be-
fore drafting the legislation embodying a licensing program. 188 Speci-
fication standards tend to be bureaucratically favored because they
appear easier to administer, they insure maximum control by the
185 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-5.05(d) (Supp. 1971).
	 -
186 See, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 6688 (1971) ; 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regs. § 176.5(d)
(1969) ; Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District Rules & Regs. Rule 10 (1969).
187 Small businesses are the most likely to be shut down. They often cannot afford the
control equipment, and from the standpoint of the enforcing jurisdiction, the economic and
social consequences of a shutdown are not dramatic. The impact of stringent control
regulations upon small business is an important, and as yet unexamined national economic
problem. Interviews with Theodore A. Schwartz, Esq., former N.J. Deputy Attorney
General in charge of air pollution control, July 10, 1968, and May 26, 1969.
188 For an excellent discussion of performance and specification standards, and the
permit system of the San Francisco Bay !area, see Walker, Enforcement of Performance
Requirements with Injunctive Procedure, 70 Ariz. L. Rev. 81 (1968).
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agency, and they avoid for the agency the embarrassing problem of
refusing an operating permit after the equipment has been constructed
in accordance with agency-approved plans.'" On the other hand, speci-
fication standards are clearly disadvantageous in an area of developing
technology, like air pollution control, where innovation is necessary
and desirable. Additional disadvantages are the tendency of the en-
gineering staff to be overcautious, since the agency is committed to the
sufficiency of the design, and the substantial time consumed by the
staff in the role they assume as unpaid consultants to the owner of
the equipment.'" SMall equipment operators tend to prefer specifica-
tion standards principally because of their lack of interest in design
experimentation, while large operators, employing their own engineer-
ing staffs, prefer more flexible standards that allow for innovation. In
addition, small operators probably obtain the greater benefit from con-
sultation with agency engineers.
In order to permit some satisfaction of each of these competing
and conflicting needs, legislation should be cast as performance stan-
dards whenever possible. The agency may then enact regulatory speci-
fication standards, allowing, as an alternative, the general statutory
performance standard. It is the owner in this case who, having chosen
between the alternative standards, takes the risk. Several examples of
air pollution control performance standards are instructive and useful.
The federal model regulations require new sources to be "in accordance
with the latest available control technology so as to reduce emissions
to a minimum."191
 New York City's Air Pollution Control Code re-
quires that "the equipment incorporate advances in the art of air
pollution control developed for the kind and amount of air contaminant
emitted by the applicant's equipment." 192 New Jersey's Code contains
this same wording.143
A final problem generated by equipment licensing programs arises
from the fact that equipment licensing regulations are generally appli-
cable only to new or altered equipment. Their purpose is to prevent pol-
lution from new sources by requiring the equipment to be designed and
installed in a manner that the agency deems adequate to minimize the
emission of pollutants. Such programs generally encounter little resis-
tance from polluters because the equipment upgrading is required only
if the polluter chooses to replace, alter, or install new equipment. Initial
189 Id. at 86.
190 Id.
191 36 Fed. Reg. 6688 (1971).
192 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-5.11(a) (2) (Supp. 1971).
193 N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 9, § 4.1 (1971): In addition, New York City
and New Jersey require that the equipment operate without violating any of the air
pollution control laws. . . -
619
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
decision-making, timing, and financial planning remain in private hands,
and are not directly controlled or affected by the agency.
However, the law may also require the installation of specified
equipment or control apparatus in old as well as new equipment of a
certain type, such as incinerators, regardless of whether or not the
older source had ever violated the air pollution control laws. New York
City's' and Nassau County's'" licensing laws include this kind of
provision as well as regulations applicable to new and altered equip-
ment, while New York Staten° and New Jerseym licensing laws regu-
late only new and altered equipment. The proposed federal model regu-
lations also contained licensing provisions applicable to new and altered
equipment,'" as well as the requirement that all incinerators be up-
graded to a multiple-chamber system—more effective in cutting pol-
lution—or its equivalent.'" The model permit system was deleted in
the adopted regulations; however, the acting Administrator of the
EPA stated, in connection with the adopted regulations, that "States
still will be required to have authority to prevent construction, modifi-
cation, or operation of sources." 2" Since licensing remains the standard
regulatory technique for preventing the construction, modification, and
operation of air pollution sources, it will surely continue to be widely
used.
It may be assumed that an air pollution control law is necessarily
more effective if it encompasses the gamut of equipment licensing regu-
lations. New York City's lengthy experiences in controlling air pollu-
tion through a wide range of licensing provisions is instructive in this
respect. Since 1954, New York City has licensed new and modified
on-site incinerators"' and has required multiple burning chambers and
other devices,202 and since 1966 it has licensed all incinerators (new,
old, on-site, and municipal) whose operators choose not to discontinue
operation.203 Many of the city's on-site incinerators were built after
1 94 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, §§ 1403.2-4.01, -5.01, -5.31, -11.01 to -11.25
(Supp. 1971).
195 Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Code H 9-21.10 to .24, .50 to .60, .68 to .72 (1971).
198. 10 N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regs. H 175-80, 192 (motor vehicles) (1971).
197 N.J. Air Pollution Control Code ch. 9, ch. I1, § 2 (1971).
109 36 Fed. Reg. 6688 (1971).
199 Id. at 6691.
200 Id. at 15486.
201 New York City Admin. Code ch. 47, H 1072-3.0, 4.0 (1954) ; New York City
Dep't of Air Pollution Control, Rules and Regulations Including Fee Schedules for the
Issuance of Permits and Certificates in Conformance with Chapter 47 of the Administra-
tive Code of the City of New York, H 2.1, 13.2 (May, 1954), as amended, City Record,
Nov. 23, 1955 and Oct. 1, 1964.
202 New York City Dep't of Air Pollution Control, Rules and Regulations Including
Fee Schedules for the Issuance of Permits and Certificates in Conformance with Chapter
47 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, H 13.13-13.5.1 (May, 1954).
203 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57,10 1403.2-4.01 to .05 (Supp. 1971).
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1951; on-site incinerators were required by law in multiple dwellings
constructed after that date, presumably for the purpose of saving the
city the expense of picking up and disposing of the garbage.'" New
on-site incinerators were finally banned in 19662" Compliance figures
show that as of August 1971, fifteen percent of the incinerators oper-
ated by the New York City Board of Education, Hospital Corporation,
and Housing Authority were upgraded or discontinued in compliance
with the 1966 law 208 As of January 1, 1972, about twenty-nine percent
of privately operated incinerators were upgraded or discontinued."'
Air quality data show that after almost twenty years of licensing, on-
site and municipal incinerators continue to be a major source of city 2"
and metropolitan2" air pollution.
In 1966, New York City also licensed all fuel burning equipment
204 Since October 1951, incinerators were required in all new multiple dwellings of
four or more stories and occupied by more than 12 families. New York City Admin. Code
ch. 26, § D26-3.11 (1957), as amended, Local L. 1955, No. 113. Since 1956, incinerators
were also required in all new single room occupancy buildings. New York City Admin.
Code ch. 26, § D26-3.7(3) (1956).
sots New York City Admin. Code ch. 41, § 893-3.0 (1971), as amended, New York
City Admin, Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-4.03 (Supp. 1971). The ban, which was effective as of
May 1968, does not, of course, apply to municipal incinerators. In contrast to New York
City's unsuccessful attempts to regulate on-site incineration, Los Angeles County con-
trolled pollution from incinerators more than ten years earlier, principally by banning
single chamber on-site incinerators which were the principal means of waste disposal
(there were 1.5 million backyard incinerators, as well as small incinerators in commercial
establishments) and by Implementing county and community managed alternative means
of waste disposal. Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District Rules and Regs. Rule
58 (1955). Hagevik, Decision Processes in Air Quality Management 102-06 (thesis, Univer-
sity of North Carolina 1969) (published by Praeger, as Decision Making in Air Pollution
Control (1970)).
206 New York City Dep't of Air Resources, Bureau of Engineering, Local Law #14
Status, Public Sector (Aug. 1971). The same report stated that 20% of privately operated
incinerators were upgraded or discontinued. Figures are not available on compliance by
other governmental bodies.
207 New York City Dep't of Air Resources, Bureau of Engineering, Local Law 49
(Jan. 1972). Local Law 49 is the amended version of Local Law 14. The January report
does not contain compliance statistics by the public sector; the latest available figures are
as of August 1971.
208 New York City Dep't of Air Resources, Emission Inventory Summary (Sept.
1970). In tons per year and percentages of total pollutant emissions, incinerator emissions
were as follows: sulfur dioxide-2100 (0.5%) ; particulates-24,340 (37%) ; oxides of
nitrogen-2100 (0.7%) ; hydrocarbons-14,360 (5%) ; carbon monoxide-27,470 (2%).
Such emissions are estimated and computed, not measured.
209 Suspended particulates levels are well in excess of this standard (federal pri-
mary air quality standard) in virtually all of New York City, in most of Nassau
County, and in many areas of Westchester County. These levels must be reduced
by approximately 40% to attain primary air quality standard. Taking back-
ground levels into account, this requires an overall reduction of about 60% in
particulate emissions in the area. . . . Incineration was responsible for well over
one-quarter of all particulates emitted in New York City, Nassau and Westchester
Counties.
State Department of Environmental Conservation, Justification and Summary, Proposed
M N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regs. 197 (1971).
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using residual fuel oi1, 21° industrial equipment emitting sulfur coin
pounds (there are none in New:York City),211
 and portable construc-
tion equipment. 212
 In 1971, manufacturing and fuel burning equipment
using coal were added to the list.'" As of August 1971, forty-one per-
cent of the oil burners' operated by the New York City Board of Edu-
cation, N.Y.C. Hospital CorpOration, and the N.Y.C. Housing Author-
ity had complied,' while as of January 1, 1972, about twenty-seven
percent of private oil burners had complied. 216
 The law has not been
enforced with respect' to portable construction equipment,216 and the
agency has not required licenses issued more than three years ago to
be renewed.217
New York City's limited success in obtaining compliance with its
wide range of 'equipment licensing provisions shows that wide scale
mandatory upgrading of old equipment may encounter strong and per-
sistent resistance from private as well as governmental sectors, and may
therefore, as a practical matter, be unenforceable 2 18 The fact that the
City itself is a principal violator of its own law has certainly contrib-
uted to the failure of the City's ambitious licensing program 2 10 Addi-
tional factors include the nature of the program's upgrading requireL
ments, which were mandatory across-the-board specifiCations without
regard to the - age or other condition of the equipment, its untimely
(from the owner's vieripOint) adverse economic effect on persons and
governmental bodies too numerous to coerce easily, the continued fail-
ure to provide the enforcement and other resources needed for such a
program, and the initial failure to provide options (the incinerator
210 New York City Admin. Code ch. 41, § 892-4.2 (1971), as amended, New York
City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-5.05(6) (2) (Supp. 1971).
211 New York City Admin. Code ch. 41, § 892-4.4 (1971), as amended, New York
City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403,2-5.05 (b) (3) (Supp. 1971); interview with Alfred
Pieratti, former Executive Director of Engineering ,and Enforcement of the New York
City Dep't of Air Resources, April 12, 1971.
212 New York City Admin. Code ch. 41, § 892-4.5 (1971), as amended, New York
City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-5.05(b) (3) (Supp. 1971).
213 New York City Admin. Code di. 57, §§ 14032-5.05(b) (2), (4) (Supp. 1971).
214 New York City Dep't of Air Resources, supra note 206..
215 New York City Dep't of Air Resources, supra note 207.
210 Interview with Alfred Pieratti, supra note 211.
217 Conversation with Herbert G. Johnson, Esq., Executive Director, New York City
Environmental Control 'Board, January, 1972.
213 New York City Dep't of Air Resources, supra notes 206, 207. The percentage of
non-compliance is running from about 60% for, government fuel burning equipment using
residual oil to 85% for government incinerators, while the percentage of non-compliance
by the private sector for both types of equipment is about 70%.
212 This fact was mentioned one or more times.during nearly every executive session
of the N.Y. City Council Committee on Environmental Protection in which the Committee
considered revision of New York City's Air. Pollution Control Code.
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discontinuance provision was added in 1968) and economic incentives
(the City later helped arrange low-interest loans) 220
Efforts are now being made, within the limitations of available
resources, to enforce the law. Whether the upgrading of fuel burning
equipment, incinerators and portable construction equipment will ever
have a substantial long-term effect on air quality remains to be seen.
Even if all the equipment were licensed, or, in the case of incinerators,
eliminated, the problem of regularly inspecting the upgraded sources
would remain. The irony is that the problem of inadequate inspectorial
resources was to be solved by the 1966 upgrading legislation, which re-
quired across-the-board upgrading and a triannual license. However,
a meaningful license-renewal program also requires staffing. If re-
sources are not or cannot be made available, then sources of potentially
heavy pollution such as incinerators must be eliminated wherever pos-
sible, and fuel equipment and processes that have low pollution poten-
tial—such as natural gas, redesigned engines for construction equip-
ment, and steam for space heating—must be substituted.
B. Equipment Use and Maintenance Standards
Like emission standards, this , type of legislation is designed to
place on the owner responsibility for the management of the polluting
fuels, materials or equipment. The burden is upon the agency to main-
tain sufficient field operations to encourage compliance with statutory
standards and to catch violators, a burden that includes the provision of
eyewitness testimony to prove violations and the presence of inspec-
tors when operating violations—usually irregularly occurring and
transitory acts or omissions—occur. The feasibility of enforcement
under such conditions will depend upon the number of sources to be
policed and the degree of voluntary compliance that can be expected.
Despite a century of failure in the enforcement of New York City
housing maintenance laws, many of the air pollution control laws
piously mandate proper maintenance and operation of equipment, much
of which is located in the same housing whose maintenance the law has
not affected.221 Where economic or other interests of the owner strongly
220 To encourage compliance the Department of Air Resources let it be known in-
formally that further upgradings would not be required at the time of the next license
renewal. The real estate industry had protested about the difficulty of obtaining financing
on a three year certificate, stating that it did not want to put in new equipment in three
or even nine years. Executive Session, New York City Council Comm. on Environmental
Protection, May 24, 1971.
221
 For examples of such mandates see, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57,
f$ 1403.2-11.01, -11.03, -11.25 (Supp. 1971). For failure of maintenance laws, see Castra-
taro, Housing Enforcement: A Century of Failure in New York City, 14 N.Y.L.F. 60
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induce or compel legally substandard maintenance or operation and
where the inspectorial burden is so great as to be impractical, it is
unrealistic to expect a high degree of compliance. A similar situation
is presented in the anticipated failure of automobile owners to main-
tain control devices properly or even to retain the device, since a car
will operate perfectly well, or better, without some of the devices. The
EPA is hoping to forestall such failures by requiring installation of a
device which as a practical matter is non-removable and performs ade-
quately for 50,000 miles.222
Scattered throughout the federal proposed model regulations are
equipment use and maintenance standards 228 which, with the exception
of the mandates affecting incinerators, 224 apply to polluting industries
rather than to real estate. Given the variety of industries concerned and
potential situations likely to occur, it is impossible to generalize as to
enforcement feasibility, except to repeat that the viability of these
provisions depends upon the provision of regular spot checks.
C. Operator Licensing
Since 1966, New York City has prohibited the operation and su-
pervision of an incinerator or of fuel burning equipment using residual
fuel oil, unless the operator has a license.' The license can be obtained
by attending night class for six weeks, 228 but compliance has been
limited,'" principally because of insufficient number of classes, lan-
guage barriers, and the fact that the equipment will often function ade-
quately for the operator's purpose without his taking the precautions
necessary for good air pollution control."' Even if the licensing law
(1968); Grad, Final Report of the Study of Housing Maintenance and Enforcement May
18, 1964-June 30, 1967, Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia University (1967).
222 42 U.S.C. $ 18571(1)(d) (i) (1970). Address by Prof. James Fay of M.I.T.,
Member, Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions, National Academy of Sciences, Bar As-
sociation of the City of New York Meeting, February 23, 1972. See also Semi-Annual
Report of the Committee, January 1, 1972.
228 see, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 6688-92 (1971). Portions were deleted in the adopted
regulations. Id. at 22486-87.
224 Id. at 6688.
228 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, $ 1403.2-11.11 (Supp, 1971).
226 Interview with Alfred Pieratti, supra note 211.
227 Id. Mr. Pieratti stated "[w]ell, it's known that most operators don't have certifi-
cates. We ask for them when we check the equipment out . How many? My guess is
that 40,000 out of 50,000 don't have the certificate." Mr. Pieratti also stated that "since
1958 over 12,000 building superintendents and equipment operators of an estimated 30,000
total have attended the classes"—an indication of two-thirds non-compliance. Id. (These
statistics do not indicate the effect of job turnover, nor the type of building owner com-
plying and not complying with the law.) Finally, qualifying the conclusion that the law
had limited impact, it was stated that "the Department feels that this program has had a
beneficial impact, and plans to increase the number and availability of classes." Conversa-
tion with Lewis Chefier, New York City Dep't of Air Resources, February 16, 1972.
228 Interview with Alfred Pieratti, supra note 211. Mr. Pieratti stated that "we issue
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were complied with, then, there would remain the insoluble problem of
motivating thousands upon thousands of licensed operators and their
employers so to operate and maintain equipment that the quantity of
pollutants emitted will be substantially reduced, although their equip-
ment will function without their taking such precautions. The proposed
model regulations contain no comparable provision. It is concluded that
operator licensing requirements have serious limitations and cannot
realistically be counted on as an effective pollution control measure,
unless the obstacles mentioned above are eliminated.
VI. ENFORCEMENT DEVICES AND REMEDIES
A. Evaluation of Existing Devices and Remedies
In the absence of total voluntary compliance, the effectiveness of
an otherwise enforceable law depends on the availability of adequate
legal remedies to the enforcement agency and its application of them.
The purpose of remedial provisions in air pollution control is to deter
future violation and thus to make future imposition of the remedy un-
necessary. If remedial powers and procedures are broad, flexible, and
speedy, and the penalties are not trivial, the law can and will deter the
prohibited behavior. Six enforcement devices are usually available to
air pollution control agencies:
(1) issuance of administrative orders, particularly cease and
desist orders; 22°
(2) sealing of equipment; 2"
(3) administrative hearings; 281
(4) injunctions; 282
violation notices (informal warnings) if there is no certificate, we don't issue summonses.
It's usually not the guy's fault. We don't give many classes, and for those who speak
Spanish, we only have one class in the Bronx."
229 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-14 (Supp. 1971), which empowers the State
Department of Health to issue cease and desist orders after investigating and discovering
violations of environmental regulations; N.Y.E.C.L. § 19-0305(1) (McKinney 1972), stating
that the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation may "[dlo such other things as
he may deem necessary, proper or desirable in order that he may enforce codes, rules or
regulations . . . ."; Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Code § 9-21.6(e) (1971), vesting powers
in the County Board of Health; New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, §§ 1403.2-15.01
(b)(1), (2), (4), and -15.01(c), (d), (f) (Supp. 1971).
280 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, §§ 1403.2-15.01(b)(3), (c)(2)
(Supp. 1971); Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Code § 9-21.34 (1971).
291 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-14.1 (Supp. 1971) ; N.Y.E.C.L. § 19-0505 (Mc-
Kinney 1972) ; Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Code § 9-21.6(c) (1971) ; New York City
Admin. Code di. 57, § 1403.2-15.13 (Supp. 1971).
292 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann.	 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1971);	 § 71-2107 (Mc-
Kinney 1972) ; New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.21(a) (Supp. 1971).
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(5) penalties (civil or criminal) ; 238
(6) emergency powers."'
Statutory authority for some or all of these remedies may be avail-
able. In addition, the scope of the agency's or the court's powers vis-à-
vis each remedy may vary widely. Even within a common air pollution
basin, one enforcement agency may have broad, speedy, and flexible
powers, while another agency may be burdened by limited powers,
cumbersome procedures, and a general lack of opportunity for indepen-
dent discretion. New Jersey's enforcement scheme falls within the
former category; New York State's falls within the latter category;
and New York City's falls somewhat closer to the circumscribed in-
flexibility of New York State than to New Jersey. One test in evaluat-
ing an agency's power is to ask what an agency could do, and how
swiftly, should a serious violation occur which does not constitute an
"imminent danger." Another test is to ask what an agency could do if
the serious air pollution situation that develops is not explicitly covered
by specific statutory prohibition or criteria. It should be added that,
unlike the substantive provisions of the law whose effectiveness may
depend on adequate funding, the effectiveness of remedial provisions
depends almost entirely upon the statutory language. Ultimately, of
course, both depend upon the will of the legislature.
In New York State, the power to enforce the law is vested in the
New York State Commissioner of Environmental Conservation."'
Upon receipt of a written complaint, he may investigate the alleged
violation."' Generally, complaints are not initiated by the agency
except in special situations and those of "imminent danger"; 237
agency employs no full-time air pollution inspectors. 288
 If it appears
to the Commissioner that there has been a violation, a notice is sent
288 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1971) (civil); N.Y.E.C.L. § 71-2103
(McKinney 1972) (civil); Nassau County, N.Y., Admin. Code § 9-21.78 (1971) (crimi-
nal) ; New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, MI 1403.2-15.01(b)(5), (7) (Supp. 1971)
(criminal).
284 See, e.g., N.J. Air Pollution Code ch. 12 (1971) ; N.Y.E.C.L. § 71-0301 (McKin-
ney 1972); New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.01(f) (Supp. 1971). For an
examination of a general air pollution warning system see New York City Charter § 11.05
and Mayor's Executive Order No. 37, Environmental Protection Administration Emergency
Control Board Regulations Pertaining to the Air Warning System, June 9, 1971.
. 286
 N.Y.E.C.L. # 19-0305 (McKinney 1972).
2a8 N.Y.E.C.L. § 19-0503 (McKinney 1972).
237
 N.Y.E.C.L. § 71-0503 (McKinney 1972) ; Interviews with Harry Hovey, Assoc.
Dir, of Air Resources, New York Dep't of Environmental Conservation, in Albany, N.Y.,
March 28, 1969; Franklin Austin, Assoc. Dir. of Air Resources, New York Dep't of En-
vironmental Conservation, in White Plains, N.Y., April 25, 1969; and Albert Macklin,
Assoc. Dir, of Air Resources, New York Dep't of Environmental Conservation, New York
City, February 15, 1972.
238 Interviews with Harry Hovey, Franklin Austin and Albert Macklin, supra note
237.
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to the respondent requiring him to attend an administrative hearing.'
If the Commissioner issues a cease and desist order after the hearing,
the respondent has two available courses of action. He may request a
review by the Environmental Board, and, if still dissatisfied, seek re-
view by the courts under an Article 78 proceeding." Or he may appeal
from the cease and desist order directly to the courts for review under
Article 78 or a special proceeding. 241 Neither the Commissioner nor the
Environmental Board has the power to impose penalties or receive
financial assessments. The Attorney General must bring a separate
court action for statutory penalties.' Thus enforcement procedures
are prescribed in detail by the statute, leaving the agency limited power,
discretion and flexibility. _
In contrast, New Jersey air pollution control laws grant broad
and general powers to the agency without closely prescribing the order
in which the powers are to be exercised. The agency may investigate,
initiate, or receive complaints, issue cease and desist orders, hold ad-
ministrative hearings, institute legal proceedings to prevent air pollu-
tion (including summary injunctive relief), impose and receive penal-
ties, and comprise and settle any claim for a penalty."' Where the
regulation does not contain a specific emission standard (e.g., a stan-
dard for odors) the statute requires that an administrative hearing
precede the issuance of a cease and desist order?" Otherwise, the pro-
cedure and manner in which agency powers are exercised are deter-
mined by administrative policy, and may therefore be exercised with
considerable flexibility in any given situation while remaining within
the confines of the statute. Agency policy—and that of the Attorney
General's office, with which the agency works in close conjunction—is
to conduct its proceedings with the maximum speed appropriate to the
particular situation and to induce prompt corrections through the use
of substantial penalties and other persuasive devices. 246
Most enforcement proceedings in New Jersey begin with an
agency inspection followed directly by the service of an ex parte cease
and desist order.24° The agency employs its own inspectors, and nearly
222 	§ 19-0505 (McKinney 1972).
240 N.Y.E.C.L. § 19-0511(a) (1) (McKinney 1972).
241 N.Y.E.C.L. §19-0511 (McKinney 1972); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7803 (McKinney 1971).
The scope of the court's review of the administrative decision is set forth therein. 	 '
242 	§ 71-2103(2) (McKinney 1972).
248 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2(C)-9(d), (e), -14, -14.1, -19 (Supp. 1971).
244 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-14 (Supp. 1971).
248 Series of interviews with Richard Sullivan, State Commissioner of Environmental
Protection (formerly Dir. of Div. of Clean Air and Water) Summer, 1968; interviews
with Theodore A. Schwartz, Esq., former N.J. Deputy Attorney General in charge of air
pollution control, July 10, 1968, July 23, 1968, and May 26, 1969,
240 Interviews with Theodore A. Schwartz, supra note 245.
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all inspections are agency-initiated.' If the respondent fails to comply,
three modes of enforcement procedure are available.
First, should the violation be deemed serious and more or less con-
tinuous, the agency will immediately seek injunctive relief with penal-
ties. The reason for seeking penalties in addition to an injunction is to
decrease the likelihood of delays in compliance. It is assumed that an
alleged violator who has already played the waiting game with respect
to one or more cease and desist orders is likely to behave similarly with
respect to the compliance time allowed by the court in the injunction,
unless he is made to pay for his dilatory actions. A second type of en-
forcement procedure can be used if the violation is not serious but is
more or less continuous: a cease and desist order will be issued, after
which the respondent may request an administrative hearing. A second
cease and desist order may then be issued before the agency will insti-
tute court proceedings. Finally, if the violation is sporadic (e.g., occa-
sional burning at a dump, improper operation causing excess smoke),
the agency may issue a notice for prosecution of penalties on the second
violation after a cease and desist order for the first violation. The pen-
alties assessed are generally about two hundred dollars which the re-
spondent may voluntarily pay to the agency. If there is a persistent
failure to pay, the Attorney General may institute summary proceed-
ings to collect not only the original penalty but, if he deems it appro-
priate, maximum penalties 248
Until the fall of 1971, New York City's approach to its air pollu-
tion enforcement problems resembled that usually found in municipal
legislation. Typical municipal enforcement techniques consist of the
sealing power (an agency has the common law right to abate an activity
detrimentally affecting public safety, health, or welfare), administra-
tive orders, and criminal penalties 2 4° These were the City's only en-
forcement tools: if the violator broke a seal or ignored an order of the
Commissioner or the Environmental Board, the agency's sole remedy
was to prosecute the respondent in crowded criminal courts. If the
respondent still failed to appear or to correct the violation, or repeated
the violation, the agency's sole recourse was to prosecute again. Signifi-
cant penalties were never imposed by the criminal courts2 5° In sum, the
247 An exception is odor complaints, which are often citizen-initiated. Interviews with
Herbert Wortreich, Chief Enforcement Officer, Bureau of Air Pollution Control, N.J.
Dept of Environmental Protection, Sept. 13, 1968, and Feb. 8, 1972.
248 Interviews with Theodore A. Schwartz, supra note 245.
240
 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, {I 1403.2-15.25 (Supp. 1971).
280 The average fine imposed was about $35. Interdepartmental memo from Anthony
Incristo, farmer Admin. Ass't, Bureau of Enforcement, Environmental Board, to Joseph
Schechter, former Director of Bureau of Enforcement, Mar. 4, 1971. Mr. Incristo stated,
inter alia, that "[s]moke emission cases incline to raise the average fine due to the occa-
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City faced frustrating and expensive round-robin procedures having no
significant impact on air quality.
A substantial portion of New York City's recent Air Pollution
Control Code revision concerned enforcement. When the futility of
criminal procedures was generally acknowledged, the City Council, in
agreement with the Environmental Protection Administration, de-
cided to retain criminal enforcement and to add administrative hearing
procedures and civil penalties.2" The agency may now pursue either
civil remedies or criminal prosecutions or both. However, if the civil
procedures are evaluated in terms of breadth of scope, flexibility, and
speed, the new law appears to be not much stronger than the circum-
scribed New York State procedures.
Save for two instances described below, civil enforcement proceed-
ings begin with an agency inspection and service of a written notice to
the respondent requiring his appearance before an Environmental Con-
trol Board hearing 262
 If the respondent is dissatisfied with the admin-
istrative decision or order, he may appeal to the Environmental Control
Board to review its own decision."' If still dissatisfied, the respondent
may then appeal to the courts. At that point, the agency's attorneys are
prohibited from handling the case. Corporation Counsel is to represent
the New York City Environment Protection Administration in court."'
Moreover, at this stage the respondent is entitled, at the discretion of
the court, to a de novo trial of the case,'" and may of course pursue his
case through the courts of appeal. Thus, by creating two separate and
repetitious judicial systems handled by different attorneys, the law
severely weakens the effectiveness of the administrative hearing, delays
the agency in cases where time is of the essence, and makes it easier for
the violator to avoid a cease and desist order for months or even years,
depending on how much the delay is worth to the polluter."'
Two types of violations may be attacked by slightly more expedi-
tious procedures. The first consists of violations for failure to obtain a
license to install, alter, or operate specified equipment which may
atonal high fines of $500 for repeated (§ 9.03) offenders, while Local Law 14 (equipment
upgrading) cases are usually fined $25."
251 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, §§ 1403.2-15.01, -15.25 (Supp. 1971).
252 New York City Admin Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.05 (Supp. 1971),
gas New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.19 (Supp. 1971).
254 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.21 (Supp. 1971).
255 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, §§ 1403.2-15.19, -15.21 (Supp. 1971).
250 A new provision of the law, if used, should considerably facilitate enforcement
and avoid further procrastination. The New York City regulation allows the Environ-
mental Control Board to require the respondent to post a performance bond, or other
security, in an amount sufficient to assure compliance with its order within the time pro-
scribed. New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.01(e) (Supp. 1971). A court may
or may not stay the board's order. If the court' decides to stay the order, it may require
an appeal bond equal to the performance bond.
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cause air pollution;'.7
 since Most persons in New York City who should
have a license do not have one, it is hoped that the agency will use this
provision extensively. The other category is composed of violations
constituting, in the opinion of the Environmental Control Board, "an
imminent peril to the public health." 2" In these two instances, the
Board may issue a cease and desist order prior to an administrative
hearing.m In all other respects the procedures are those used for other
violations, and a respondent is entitled, at the discretion of the court,
to a second trial.
B. Recommendations
In evaluating. the enforcement proceedings of the two states and
New York City, a number of factors become evident. First, without a
full-time staff . to initiate inspections and investigations, an agency's
role will remain essentially passive. In addition; the time period which
elapses from the time the violation is initially observed until service of
notice of administrative hearing is undesirable due to the cumbersome
observations, reporting and investigation procedures.
Where local enforcement agencies are relied on by the states to
enforce pollution control, and a local agency's enforcement structure
is ineffective, obviously no progress toward air quality will be made.
If there are no local agencies, as in rural areas, the state must initiate
investigations and play an active role in controlling whatever air
pollution may exist. If there are strong active agencies, as in New York
City and Nassau County, the state's dependence on the local agency
has few negative repercussions.
Another factor to consider is whether agency power to issue a
cease and desist order prior to administrative hearing saves govern-
mental resources and time with respect to unprotested violations and
provides" the' agency with an initial show of strength. Agency power to
impose and collect penalties also saves resources that would otherwise
be spent in a court action to collect penalties. The collection of penalties
is expedited, and this, in turn, should induce greater compliance, since
promptness in the collection of penalties is often as important as the
amount of the penalty.
A third factor to note is that limiting the scope of judicial power
to review administiative decisions clearly strengthens the position of
the enforcing ageticy, decreases the number of appeals, and expedites
enforcement of the law. These are advantages, of course, from an
enforcerhent agency's viewpoint. Many environmentalists find limita-
257 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, 1403.2-15.01(c) (Supp. 1971).
258 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, I 1403.2-15.01(f) (Supp. 1971).
259 Id.
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tions on judicial review less attractive, and are engaging in legislative
and court battles to broaden the scope of the court's review of adminis-
trative decisions. Essentially, these environmentalists feel that they are
not getting a fair shake from the agencies and that the courts will be
more sympathetic. It is interesting that real estate interests and other
potential polluters, applying the same reasoning, protested against
giving the New York City Environmental Protection Administration
Board power to hold hearings and impose penalties. Power was given,
but only under the condition that the alleged polluter be entitled, at
the discretion of the court, to a de novo trial.'"
A final point to consider is that the handling of agency violations
by a single set of attorneys rather than by two separate agencies, as is
now done by New York City and New York State, significantly expe-
dites proceedings and prevents any weakening of the government's
case that may arise because of unfamiliarity of attorneys or a varying
degree of commitment.
On the whole, the inherent weaknesses in the enforcement proce-
dures and devices of these statutes are the result of deliberate legisla-
tive choice. New York State, for example, is committed to a policy of
decentralized air-pollution control. This policy is not entirely incon-
sistent with a strong state-wide pollution control program, so long as
local agencies are well-funded and have ample power to control com-
munity emission sources. Even then, however, it must be recognized
that a local agency generally lacks the political influence to control
large pollutors. Hence state support must still be relied on, and the
usefulness of that support will depend upon whether or not the state
agency possesses ample powers and may use them expeditiously. New
York State lacks such powers. New Jersey, on the other hand, is com-
mitted to a heavily centralized air pollution control effort, which
is said to be amply funded and politically supported."' Finally, the
weaknesses in New York City's air pollution control code have been
ascribed to a combination of deliberate legislative choice and admin-
istrative problems, arising from political pressure and an internecine
power struggle between the Environmental Protection Administration
and Corporation Counsel."'
VII. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES
The purpose of imposing penalties for air pollution is to deter vio-
lations and thus to make the imposition of the penalty unnecessary.'"
2" Executive Session, N.Y. City Council, Committee on Environmental Protection,
May 14, 1971.
201 Interviews with Richard Sullivan and Theodore A. Schwartz, supra note 245.
2" Id.
2" In air pollution control regulation, the philosophy that the sole purpose of the
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For penalties to be effective deterrents, two basic conditions must be
satisfied: the amount of the penalty should be meaningful—it can be
neither trivial nor outrageous204—and the procedures preceding the
imposition of the penalty should be speedy without abusing respon-
dent's procedural rights.
In examining and evaluating penalty provisions, a number of
guidelines may be used. One such guideline is the minimum fine. The
minimum fine is at least as important as the maximum in determining
whether the amount of the fine is meaningful, because the minimum fine
is generally imposed far more frequently than any other fine.' The
minimum amount cannot be trivial, and the maximum must be suffi-
ciently substantial to be significant to most business organizations. For
major companies, the only financially significant fine is probably one
that exceeds the cost of compliance, and that amount may be out-
rageously excessive to other violators.'" In dealing with the major
company, then, other techniques, such as publicizing the violation, may
be the most effective enforcement tool."' A relatively unblemished com-
munity or national image is generally a highly valued intangible asset.
The method by which a fine is assessed is another important con-
sideration. A per diem fine is more desirable than a fine per offense
because most air pollution emissions are more or less repetitive and
cumulative assaults on the environment, rather than single acts. If the
emission is sporadic, a per diem fine is as fair as a per offense fine. The
advantage of a per diem penalty is that continuing violators incur severe
penalties through accumulation even though the basic per diem penalty
is not unreasonably large.
fine is to eliminate violations (not to punish violators br to collect revenue) is embodied
in provisions authorizing the agency to compromise and settle a penalty, including a
rebate of the penalty. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1971). For an interest-
ing study of penalties see Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 274
(1967).
284 Commentators, in discussing the effectiveness of legal penalties, have stated:
Historical materials, case studies, and experimental evidence raise serious doubts
about the proposition that sanction effectiveness is a linearly increasing function
of severity of prescribed punishment. For one thing, when the threat of severe
punishment is extended to a variety of offenses which are not considered serious
hazards to community welfare, the penalties are unlikely to be enforced.
Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 263, at 277.
265 This statement is based on New York City experiences. The bulk of pollution
violations consist of the same routine infractions and rather automatically receive what-
ever may be the statutory minimum fine.
286 To some extent, this problem may be handled legislatively by classifying violators
with respect to penalties in a rational, non-discriminatory fashion. See, e.g., New York
City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.25 (Supp. 1971), which distinguishes between "a
person, other than a corporation" and "a corporation," and imposes heavier fines on the
latter. A caveat to such provisions is that they may raise constitutional issues.
267 Interview with Theodore A. Schwartz, supra note 245.
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A significant factor to consider in any penalty provision is whether
the fine commences from the first day of the violation, as in New York
City,' or from the date on which the violation was to have been
eliminated in accordance with a cease and desist order, as in New York
State2" and New Jersey.27° Cease and desist orders generally give the
violator ample time in which to correct the violation, and therefore the
amount of the fine may be significantly less if it runs from the date the
violation was to have been eliminated.271 The amount of the fine is also
affected by the procedures required before the cease and desist order
may issue. in New York State the procedures appear to be cumbersome
and slow: the order can be issued only after an administrative hearing,
which generally takes place following a written complaint and local
investigation. Even if all is done speedily, considerable time elapses.
New Jersey procedure is less cumbersome; the cease and desist order
may be issued at the time of the initial agency inspection. 272 In New
York City there is no provision specifying the time at which the penalty
commences; the penalty is for each day the violation continues, and
therefore can be quite substantial if the agency so chooses?"
Another factor to be considered in evaluating statutory penalty
provisions for clean air violations is the increase, if any, that the fine
undergoes with successive violations.274 Although it may appear more
equitable for the amount of the fine to increase per offense, in actual
operation it is more effective to impose a statutory minimum-maximum
penalty, per day or per violation. A reasonable fine can then be deter-
mined under all of the circumstances without deciding the legal tech-
nicalities of whether the same defendant repeatedly committed each
offense in question. In New York City, for example, it is the practice of
violators before the criminal court to juggle defendants in order to
avoid increasing penalties?" An individual equipment operator may
be the defendant, or the individual plant manager, or the corporation.
The practice is tolerated by the courts and Corporation Counsel. For
268 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, 1403.2-15.01(b) (5) (Supp. 1971).
269 	§ 71-2103(1) (McKinney 1972).
270 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-I9 (Supp. 1971).
271 In the case of an ongoing daily violation, such as failure to obtain a license or an
equipment violation, the agency may fine the violator for a limited time period, decided
on by the agency, rather than for the full period of the violation. Regardless of the statu-
tory language, then, the fine may be considerably less than would appear solely from an
analysis of the legislative provision.
272 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1971).
278 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.01(b) (5) (Supp. 1971).
274 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 14032-15.25(g) (Sum]. 1971).
270 E. Schachter, New York City Air Pollution Enforcement 78-98, July, 1971 (un-
published paper for the Ford Foundation).
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about fifteen years now, Con Edison has used this "legal" device to
receive hundreds of inexpensive first and second offense penalties.'"
It appears that jail penalties have never been imposed for an air
pollution violation in this country, 2" probably because jail is consid-
ered much too severe a penalty for a white-collar business crime, al-
though it would appear that the threat of jail is sometimes useful in
obtaining compliance. Considering the poor compliance record of the
City's' polluters, however, reliance on the threat of jail as a meaningful
deterrent appears questionable. If a jurisdiction's procedures are exclu-
sively criminal and the courts are extremely crowded, as is common in
large or growing urban areas, it is likely that a long lapse will ensue
between the time of the offense and the imposition of the penalty.
If the procedures are exclusively civil, as in New York and New
Jersey,278 or mixed civil and criminal, as in New York City,2" it is
important to note whether the enforcing agency has the power to im-
278 The following table, prepared by the author, demonstrates this point:
CON EDISON COURT CASES
1963-1970
Summonses
Served
Convic-
tions
Withdrawn
by the
City
Dismissed
	Pending
by the
	
Adjust-
City
	
ments
Fines
Collected
1963 5 5 — —	 — $ 125
1964 7 7 — —	 — 275
1965 16 15 1 —	 — 1,175
1966 15 5 2 8	 — . 800
1967 24 13 3 8	 — 1,575
1968 12 1 3 8	 — 250
1969 61 10 5 11	 35 -	 425,
1970 197 6 8 31	 152 210
Totals 337 62 22 66	 187 $4,835
Average fine per conviction $78.00
CON EDISON COURT CASES
1971
1971 22 9 13 $25
(in a carry-
over 1969
case)
277 In late 1971, under the Refuse Act of 1899, several criminal indictments and
threats of imprisonment were brought against owners and executives of companies pollut-
ing the water. These included the owners of J.J. O'Donnell Woolers Co. of Grafton, Mass.,
and Bettinger Corp. of Milford, Mass., and a manager of U.S. Steel's South Works of
Chicago. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1971, at 24, col. 1; id., Nov. 14, 1971, I) 6, at 4, col. 2.
278 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1971) ; N.Y.E.C.L. 71-2103 (McKin-
ney 1972).
279 See, e.g., New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, §§ 1403.2-15.04 -15.25 (Supp:
1971).
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pose and collect-penalties.2 8° If' it does not, as in New York State,28'
court procedures, necessarily slow; will be required, and accordingly
far fewer penalties will be collected.
A few penalty provisions in the New York City Code are worth
noting. There is a substantial fine for falsification of applications or
reports."' If enforced, this fine should facilitate the use of the licensing
system as an effective enforcement tool. Double fines with a maximum
amount are provided for failure to pay the civil penalty to court, a
clearly useful principle. 283. However, the present maximum of $2,000 in
the case of corporations can hardly be a deterrent to a substantial
business.
Statutes now often provide that an enforcing agency may remit all
or part of a penalty if the respondent promptly corrects the violation.'"
Such a provision is most welcome because it induces compliance in a
positive manner, is fair to the violator who wishes to be law-abiding,
and acknowledges that the primary purpose of the law is correction
of the violation rather than punishment of the violator.
Recent New York City legislation authorizing citizen suits and
complaint procedures incorporates a bounty provision. Under specified
circumstances, an informer who provides information or evidence lead-
ing to the imposition of a civil penalty may be awarded a percentage
of the fine collected by the agency.'" In addition, the law provides that
twenty-five percent of any criminal fine may be paid to "the person or
persons giving information which 'shall lead to conviction.' 280 The
latter provision is modeled on section 411 of the Refuse Act of 1899,287
under which at least two bounties have been awarded in the New York
metropolitan area.'"
CONCLUSION
A legislative draftsman's approach to any new regulatory area
such as air pollution must of necessity be eclectic and experimental.
The guidelines provided by the EPA to assist state and local govern-
ments to comply with the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act state
28a See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1971) ; New York City Admin. Code
ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.01(b) (5)-(7) (Supp. 1971).
261 See, e.g., N.Y.E.C.L. § 71-2103 (3) (McKinney 1972)
282 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.25(a) (Supp. 1971)„
288 New York City Admin. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.25(f) (Stipp. 1971).
284 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann, § 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1971) ; New York City Admin. Code
ch. 57, § 1403.2-15.01(b) (5) (Supp. 1971).
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broad and desirable goals but lack the concreteness and specificity
necessary to attain these goals. Environmentalists, legislators and
draftsmen seeking to improve air quality must look for guidance else-
where. With the nationwide proliferation of state and local air pollution
control legislation required by the Clean Air Amendments, it is impor-
tant to understand the limitations of commonly used regulatory tech-
niques and the reasons why particular ones have succeeded, while
others have failed to reduce or control air pollution. Such knowledge
is crucial in evaluating the probable success of newer regulatory tech-
niques.
Much can be learned from the legislative and enforcement experi-
ences of state and local governments within the New York-New Jersey
metropolitan area. The many failures within this geographical area
have been caused, principally, by a lack of funds and failure to gauge
the enforcement feasibility of specific legislation in regulating partic-
ular types and numbers of polluters. The successes appear primarily
where outright banning of polluting materials and activities has been
utilized. Banning is an extreme but sometimes necessary measure re-
quiring considerable political courage and planning. Although it is not
practical to ban the purchase, sale and use of fuels, equipment, pro-
cesses and materials, draftsmen should maximize the use of this regu-:
latory technique, especially in situations where other measures have
been tried but have failed to decrease air pollution significantly. It is
hoped that some of the lessons learned in the New York-New Jersey
area will not be lost on legislators and draftsmen seeking to improve air
quality within that region and in other areas of the country.
The catchword for the draftsman of environmental legislation is
"effectiveness." The ineffectiveness of present air pollution legislation
is evident from the continued befoulment of ambient air, particularly
in metropolitan areas like the New York-New Jersey basin. The Clean
Air Amendments have fostered and will continue to spur a large
amount of statutory and regulatory verbiage aimed at improving air
quality. However, legislators have apparently failed to realize that
environmental legislation without impact is worse than none at all,
since it creates among citizens a feeling that something is being done
and so dulls their sense of urgency and leads to a cessation of efforts
to improve air quality in deed as well as word. The sensitivity of drafts-
men and legislators to the need for effective regulations and laws will
be the ultimate determinant of the quality of the air we breathe. A care-
ful study of prior experiences, such as the one that the foregoing anal-
ysis has attempted to provide, is a necessary preliminary to effective
legislative action in air pollution control.
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